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INTRODUCTION
The STS-61 Space ShuttleProgramMissionReport summarizesthe Hubble Space
Telescope(HST) servicingmissionas well as the Orbiter,ExternalTank (ET),
Solid Rocket Booster (SRB),RedesignedSolid Rocket Motor (RSRM),and the Space
Shuttlemain engine (SSME)systemsperformanceduring the fifty-ninthflightof
the Space ShuttleProgramand fifth flightof the OrbitervehicleEndeavour
(OV-I05). In addition to the Orbiter,the flightvehicleconsistedof an ET
designatedat ET-60; three SSME'swhich were designatedas serialnumbers2019,
2033, and 2017 in positionsI, 2, and 3, respectively_and two SRB's which were
designatedBI-063. The RSRMs thatwere installedin each SRB were designatedas
360L023A (lightweight)for the left SRB, and 360L023B (lightweight)for the
right SRB.
This STS-61 Space ShuttleProgramMissionReport fulfillsthe Space Shuttle
Programrequirementas documentedin NSTS 07700,Volume VIII, AppendixE. That
documentrequires that each major organizationalelementsupportingthe Program
report the resultsof their hardwareevaluationand missionperformanceplus
identifyall relatedin-flightanomalies.
The primaryobjectiveof the STS-61missionwas to performthe first on-orblt
servicingof the Hubble Space Telescope. The servicingtasks includedthe
installationof new solar arrays,replacementof the Wide Field/Planetary
Camera I (WF/PC I) with WF/PC II, replacementof the High Speed Photometer(HSP)
with the CorrectiveOptics Space TelescopeAxial Replacement(COSTAR),
_- replacementof rate sensingunits (RSUs)and electroniccontrolunits (ECUs),
installationof new magnetic sensingsystemsand fuse plugs, and the repairof :
the GoddardHigh ResolutionSpectrometer(GHRS). Secondaryobjectiveswere to
perform the requirementsof the IMAX Cargo Bay Camera (ICBC),the IMAX Camera,
and the Air Force Maul Optical Site (AMOS)CalibrationTest.
The STS-61 missionwas plannedas a nominalll-daymissionwith two contingency
days availableshould Orbiter contingencyoperationsor weatheravoidancebe
required. The sequenceof events for the STS-61missionis shown in Table I.
The officialOrbiterProjectOffice ProblemTrackingList is shown in Table II,
and the officialGovernmentFurnishedEquipment(GFE) ProblemTracking List is
shown in Table III. In addition,the Integrationand Payloadin-flight
anomaliesare referencedin the applicablesectionsof the report. AppendixA
lists the sourcesof data, both formaland informal,thatwere used in the
preparationof this document. AppendixB providesthe definitionof acronyms
and abbreviationsused in this document. All times are given in Greenwichmean
time (G.m.t.)as well as missionelapsedtime (MET).
The seven-personcrew for this fifty-ninthflightof the Space ShuttleProgram
consistedof Richard O. Covey, Col., U. S. Air Force, Commander;Kenneth
Bowersox,Cdr., U. S. Navy, Pilot_KathrynC. Thornton,Civilian,Mission
• SpecialistI; Claude Nicollier,Civilian,Mission Specialist23 JeffreyA.
Hoffman,Civilian,MissionSpecialist33 F. Story Musgrave,M.D., Ph.D.,
Civilian,PayloadCommanderand MissionSpecialist4; and Thomas D. Akers, Lt.
Col., U. S. Air Force, MissionSpecialist5. STS-61was the fifth space flight
for Mission Specialist4 (PayloadCommander),the fourthspace flightfor the
[
Commanderand Mission Specialist3; the third space flight for Mission _
Specialist1 and Mission Specialist5; and the second space flight for the Pilot
and Mission Specialist2.
MISSIONSUMMARY
The countdownfor the firstlaunchattemptof STS-61on Decemberi, 1993,was
scrubbedbecausethe crosswindat theShuttleLandingFacility(SLF)exceeded
the 15-knotlimit. The countdownproceededsmoothlyup to theT-9 minuteholdl
however,thisholdwas continuedbecauseof thecrosswindcondition.
Approximately45 minutesinto thehold,thecountdownwas resumeduntilthe
T-5 minutepointwas reached,afterwhichtheholdwas reinstatedthroughthe
end of the launchwindow. Duringtheextendedhold,cloudcoverdevelopedover
the launcharea thatviolatedthe8,000-ftminimumrequiredby RangeOperations.
The launchwas rescheduledforDecember2, 1993.
The December2, 1993,countdownfor the secondlaunchattemptproceeded
nominallywith no unplannedholds. The STS-61launchoccurredat theplanned
timeof 336:09:26:59.983G.m.t.(04:27a.m.e.s.t.)on December2, 1993.
Therewere no significantanomaliesduringascent.
Flightevaluationresultsindicatethatall SSMEandRSRM startsequences
occurredas predicted,and thelaunchphaseperformanceof theSSMEs,ET, and
mainpropulsionsystem(MPS)was satisfactoryin all respects.SRB separation,
entry,deceleration,and waterimpactoccurredas predicted.Both SRBswere ..----
successfullyrecoveredand are beingrefurbished.
The determinationof vehiclepropulsiveperformanceduringascentwas madeusing
vehicleacceleration,and preflight-predictedpropulsiondata. From thesedata,
theaverageflight-derivedenginespecificimpulse(Isp),as determinedfor the
timeperiodbetweenSRB separationand startof 3-g throttling,was
452.0secondsas comparedwith the tagvalueof 452.77seconds.
No orbitalmaneuveringsubsystem(OMS)1 maneuverwas required.The OMS-2
maneuverwas initiatedat 336:10:10:29.8G.m.t[00:00:43:29.8missionelapsed
time (MET)]. The 201.5-secondmaneuverprovideda differentlalvelocity(aV)of
324.5 ft/sec,and theresultingorbitwas 308.4by 214.9nmi. Duringtheearly
partof the firing,theleftOMS totalquantityindicationdroppedsuddenlyto
44.6percent. Laterin themissionduringthe rendezvouscoellipticmaneuver
(NSR)at 337:13:11G.m.t.(01:03:41MET),thequantityindicationreturnedto
properoperation.The indicationremainednominalfor theremainderof the
mission.
The payloadbay door openingwas completedsatisfactorilyat 336:10:56:32G.m.t.
(00:01:29:32MET).
Duringthe firstrendezvousphasingmaneuver(NC)1 at 336_4:54:28.9G.m.t.
(00:05:27:28.9MET),the rightOMS heliumtankpressurein cation(V43P5122C)
failedlow. This tankhas a redundantsensorfor thismeasurement,and data
from thatmeasurementweregood. At 338:03:21G.m.t.(01:17:51MET),just prior
r-- to the OMS-6 rendezvousphasingmaneuver (NC3),the indicationwas restoredwhen
' the right OMS helium isolationvalves were opened. The measurementcontinuedto
operateproperly.
Rendezvouswith the HST was completed,and the HST was grappled.at
338:08:46:56G.m.t. (01:23:19:56MET). Berthingof the HST in the flight
servicestructure(FSS) was completedat 338:09:24:30G.m.t. (01:23:57:30MET).
Reactioncontrolsubsystem(RCS) thrusterL2U was deselectedby the redundancy
management(RM) at 338:02:34:20G.m.t. (01:17:07:20MET). Injector temperatures
showed both oxidizerand fuel flow, but no chamberpressure. Due to the
telemetryformatload (TFL) being used at the time, thrusterL2U was in a group
of thrustersthat had a downllstdata rate of one sample/second;therefore,data
did not capture the actual pressure.
The first extravehicularactivity(EVA) of 7 hours 53 minutes58 secondsended
with all planned tasks completed. These tasks includedreplacementof HST RSUs
2 and 3, changeoutof the RSU ECUs 1 and 3, replacementof fuse plugs,and
preparationsfor solar array changeout.
The second EVA of 6 hours 35 minutes30 secondswas successfullycompletedas
planned. The HST solar arrayswere replacedand an alivenesstest of the new
arrays was successfullycompleted. One of the originalsolar arraysdid not
stow properly (partiallyretracted),and it had to be jettisoned,and the other
originalsolar array was stowedand returnedto Earth.
/ At approximately340:15:10G.m.t. (04:05:43BET), the APU 2 fuel line, fuel
pump, and gas generatorvalve module (GGVM)system A heatersdid not turn on at
the expectedcycle-on temperatureof approximately830F. The bypass llne
temperaturedropped from 83°F to 66°F over a 6-hour periodand reacheda steady
decay rate of l°F/hour. The lower fault detectionannunciation(FDA) limit for
this measurementis 60OF. The crew switchedto the B heater at 341:00:06G.m.t.
(04:14:39MET) prior to reaching the lower limit, and properoperationwas
observed. Postfllghttroubleshootingisolatedthe anomalyto the thermostat.
Upon egress from the airlockby EV3 (Thornton)for the secondEVA, EV3 could no
longer receive transmissionsfrom in-cablncrewmemberson the 296.8 MHz
receiver. However, EV3 could still receivecommunicationsfrom EV4 (Akers)in
both communicationsmodes (A and B). As a result,the EVA was continuedwith
EV4 relayingmessages to EV3. However,about 3 hours 15 minuteslater, EV3
began receivingcommunicationsfrom the Orbiterwith no action taken. Near the
end of the EVA, Orbiter communicationswere again lost by EV3. When EV3
switched to hard-llnecommunicationsin the airlock,EV3 was still unable to
receivecommunicationsfrom the Orbiter.
All planned tasks for the third EVA, which was 6 hours 47 minutes21 secondsin
length,were completed. These tasks includedinstallationof the WF/PC II and
the replacementof magneticsensingsystem (MSS) 1 and 2. In addition,some of
the easier tasks planned for the fourthEVA were also completed.
The fourth EVA was 6 hours 50 minutes52 secondsin duration,and all planned
tasks were completed. These tasks includedremovalof the HSP, installationof
f-- the COSTAR and installationof the DF-224 coprocessor. Extravehicular/
crewmember 3 (EV3) continued to have intermittent communications problems during o_
the fourth EVA, just as experienced in the second EVA. During the periods of
intermittent communications, the EV4 crewmember could still communicate with
EV3, and as a result, the EVA was continued using the same communications
protocol as used during the second EVA.
The HST reboost maneuver was 61 seconds in duration and was performed with
forward RCS thrusters FIF, F2F, F3D, and F4D at 343:02:26 G.m.t. (06:16:59 MET).
A 321-nmi. circular orbit was achieved as a result of this maneuver.
The fifth EVA was 7 hours 21 minutes in duration, and all planned tasks were
performed. Tasks performed during this final EVA included replacement of the
Solar Array Drive Electronics (SADE), installation of the GHRS power supply
redundancy kit, manual deployment of the primary deployment mechanisms (PDMs) of
both solar arrays and installation of protective enclosures for both Mass. The
total EVA time for this mission was 35 hours 28 minutes 41 seconds. Following
the EVA, the HST solar-array secondary drive mechanisms (SDMs) were deployed,
battery charging was completed, and both high-gain antennas were deployed in
preparation for HST release on flight day 9.
Following completion of all servicing tasks, the HST was grappled at
344:07:44:14 G.m.t. (07:22:17:14 MET) and released at 344:10:26:47 G.m.t.
(08:00:59:47 MET), about 3 hours later than planned to obtain additional insight
into a data interface unit failure in the HaT.
Following HST release, two RCS separation maneuvers were performed. The first
maneuver was initiated at 344:10:27:21G.m.t. (08:01:00:21 MET) and had a 6V of _--
0.45 ftlsec. The second maneuver was initiated at 344:10:57:23 G.m.t.
(08:01:30:23 MET) and had a AV of 1.2 ftlsec.
Flight control system (FCS) checkout was performed with all systems operating
nominally. APU 1 was started at 346:02:28:37 G.m.t. (09:17:01:38 MET) and
operated for 4 mlnutes 40 seconds, consuming approximately 13 ib of fuel.
Hydraulic system 1 performance was also nominal. WSB cooling was not required
because of the short APU run time.
The payload bay doors were closed at 347:01:37:41G.m.t. (10:16:10:41 MET). The
deorbit maneuver was performed at 347:04:14:45 G.m.t. (10:18:47:45 MET). The
maneuver was approximately 295.2 seconds in duration and the aV was
522.8 ftlsec. Entry interface occurred at 347:04:54:39 G.m.t.
(10:19:27:39 MET).
The 212,828-Ib Orbiter touched down on the Shuttle Landing Facility concrete
runway 33 at 347:05:25:37 G.m.t. (10:19:58:37 MET) on December 12, 1993. The
Orbiter drag chute was deployed satisfactorily at 347:05:25:41.4 G.m.t., and
nose landing gear touchdown occurred 4.6 seconds after drag chute deployment.
The drag chute was Jettisoned at 347:05:26:07.6 G.m.t. with wheels stop
occurring at 347:05:26:26 G.m.t. The rollout was normal in all respects. The
flight duration was I0 days 19 hourz 58 minutes 37 seconds. All three APU's
were powered down by 347:05:44:09 !:_a.t. The crew completed the required
postflight reconfigurations and departed the Orbiter landing area at
347:06:10 G.m.t.
4
,F-. During the shutdownof the APUs followingthe postlandinghydraulicsload test,
; an load increasewas noted in the APU 3 data, and the load was presentuntil
APU 3 was shut down. An increasein the SSME 3 return pressurewas also noted
during this period. Postfllghttestinghas identifiedthe cause of the
conditions. At the time when these conditionswere present, the SSMEs were
being driven to the rain drain position. The SSME 1 thrustvector control(TVC)
actuatorwas against its hardstopbecauseof the presenceof a +i0" retraction
commmandand the additionalretractionof 0.8° causedby thermalgradients.
When APU 1 was shut down, the actuatorswitchedto hydraulicsystem 3 and went
into the "chatter"mode. This mode occursnormallywhen an actuatoris lightly
into the hardstop. While operatingin the "chatter"mode, the actuatorpower
spool oscillatesat approximately50 Hertz, allowinghydraulicfluid to pass
from the supply to return. The hydraulicflow rate can be increasedas much as
18 gallons/minutein this mode.
The postflightinspectionof the payloadbay doors revealeda clip that retained
the doghoneseal betweenport payloadbay door panels 1 and 2 had broken away
from the graphite/epoxyretainingangle.
PAYLOADS
BUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPESERVICING
Resultsof the completedBST checkoutindicatethat all replacementhardwarefor
the HST is operatingproperly.
The STS-61 payloadsconsistedof all the stowagehardwareand HST hardware that
were used in this first servicingmission to the HST, plus the IMAX camera
located in the payloadhay and the IMAX cameralocatedin the cabin. In
addition,more than 200 tools and crew aids were onboardfor supportof the
servicingtasks.
The primaryservicingtasks consistedof the followingitems which are listed in
the order of priority:
a. Replace the solar arrays with the improvedsolar array II, which was
designed to eliminatethe "jitter"caused by the thermallyinducedflexingof
the originalsolar arrays. Retractionof the solar arrays was to he completed
betweenEVA 1 and EVA 2. The negative-axlssolar array was retractedand stowed
satisfactorily_however, the positive-axissolar array was bowed, and this array
was only retractedabout 30 percentbecauseof the possibilityof breakageof
the bowed and twistedbistem creatinga potentialEVA hazard. This solar array
replacementtask was completedsuccessfullyduring the secondEVA. The
unretractedpositive-axissolar array was manuallyjettisonedbyan
extravehicularcrewmember. This jettisonprovidedsome of the more dramatic
video that was taken during the mission. The retractedsolar array was stowed
in the cargo hay for return and postflightanalysis. The solar arrays were
deployedduring the fifth EVA with help from the crew in operatingthe primary
deploymentmechanisms (PDMs). After the assist from the crew, the solar arrays
unfurlednominally,and functionaltestingof the arrays was completedwith
satisfactoryresultsprior to releaseof the BST from the RMS.
b. ReplaceRate SensingUnit 2. This RSU replacementtaskwas completed o_...
successfullyduring the first EVA. The crew experiencedsome difficultyclosing
the aft shroud doors after the RSU changeoutwas completed. However, the
initialdoor latch misalignmentwas correctedand the doors were successfully
closed,latched,and bolted.
c. Replace the WF/PC I with WF/PC II and installfour new instrumentfuse
plugs. The WF/PC and fuse replacementswere completedsuccessfullyduring the
third EVA. A satisfactoryalivenesstest was completedon flight day three,and
the satisfactoryfunctionaltestingof the camerawas completedon flight day 6.
The camera that was removedfrom the HST was stowed in the cargo bay for return
and subsequentpostflightanalysis.
d. Replace the High Speed Photometer with the Corrective Optics Space
Telescope Axial Replacement. This replacement task was completed successfully
during the fourth EVA. Functional testing of the COSTAR was successfully
completed prior to the fifth EVA. The HSP was stored in the cargo bay for
return and postflight analysis.
e. Install new magnetic sensing system I. This replacement task was
completed successfully during the third EVA. Allveness tests of the replaced
hardware were satisfactory.
f. Replace Rate Sensing Unit 3 along with electronic control unit 3. This
task was completed very satisfactorily during the first EVA. After completion
of this task along with the RSU 2 replacement and the ECU I secondary priority
task, satisfactory aliveness and functional tests were performed on the gyros ....
As a result, the HST has six functioning gyros.
g. Replace the failed Solar Array Drive Electronics 1 assembly with a new
Solar Array Drive Electronics package. This SADE replacement task was completed
successfully during the fifth EVA. The electronics were used to successfully
unfurl the solar arrays.
The secondaryservicingtasks consistedof the followingitems which are listed
in order of priority:
a. Installa power supply redundancykit for the GoddardHigh Resolution
Spectrometer. This installationtask was completedsuccessfullyduring the
fifth EVA. The replacedhardwarepassed the allvenessand functionaltests.
b. Installa 386 coprocessoron the HST's DF-224 primarycomputer. This task
was completedsuccessfullyduring the fourthEVA. Alivenessand functional
tests were satisfactorilycompletedon flight day 7. Subsequentto the
coprocessorinstallation,a downlinkcommunicationsanomalyoccurred. Stored
programmiscompareswere attributedto marginalKu-band transmissionstrength.
The conditionexisted before coprocessorinstallation. Continuedtesting
isolated the fault to the A side of data interfaceunit 2 (DIU-2),one of four
installedonboard the HST. Operationswere switchedover to the B side and the
problemwas cleared.
c. Install new magnetic sensing system 2. This replacement task was
completed successfully during the third EVA. A satisfactory functional test of --_
the unit was completed.
_ Duringthe installationoperations,thecrewrecoveredtwoloosenedsidesfrom
the originalMSS-2instrument.A teamof groundpersonnelwas formedto
determineif correctiveactionrepairswererequiredto thenewlyinstalled
unit to protecttheBST fromany piecesof degradingfoamfromtheMSS
instruments.Protectivecoverswere fabricatedby thecrewandwere placedon
theMSS unitsduringthe fifthEVA.
d. Installfournew 6-amperegyrofuseplugsin placeof thecurrent
3-ampereplugs. This taskwas completedsuccessfullyduringthefirstEVA.
e. ReplaceelectronicontrolunitI. Thisreplacementaskwas also
completedsuccessfullyduringthefirstEVA. Alivenessand functionaltesting
was completedsatisfactorily.
Followingcompletionof all servicingtasks,theHST wasgrappledand lifted
from theFSS, thereactionwheelsand safe-modelectronicsassemblywere
activated,and theaperturedoorwas opened. The HSTwas positionedfor release
and thepointingsystemwas initialized.HST releaseoccurredat
344:10:26:50G.m.t.(08:07:59:50MET). Tip-offratesat releasewere
0.054deg/sec,[(VI)0.041deg/sec,(V2)0.003deg/sec,and (V3)
0.012deg/sec).The maximumallowabletip-offratewas 0.2 deg/sec.
The HST softwaresun-pointcaptureoccurredwithin1 minute20 secondsof
release,and theHST was placedunderonboardcomputercontrolusing
ground-generatedcommandloads. All HST systemswereoperatingproperlyas this
reportwas published.
/f
PAYLOADSERVICINGTOOLSAND CREWAIDS
In excessof 200 toolsand crewaidswereavailableforuse duringthefiveEVAs
to servicetheBST.Throughout he fiveEVAs,approximately40 toolswereused;
theremainderwereavailablefor contingencies,but theothertoolswere not
used.
Oneof thetwoJSC-suppliedHSTpowertoolsfailed(FlightProblemSTS-61-F-07).
Indicationsarethata switchproblemdevelopedin thetoolandcausedthe
failure.Theotherpowertoolalsohada speedsettingfailure,butthetool
remainedusable.
IMAXCABINCAMERAAND IMAXCARGOBAY CAMERA
Both IMAXcamerasoperatedproperlythroughouthemissionand all available
film [onerollfor theIMAXcargobay camera(ICBC)and sevenrollsfor theIMAX
cabincamera]was exposed. No IMAXcameraproblemsor anomalieswere
identified.
The ICBCwas installedto filmHST servicingoperations.The ICBCwas mounted
in the aft portcornerof thepayloadbay (bay13). The opticalaxisof the
ICBCwas in a fixedpositionwitha yaw of 29.7degreesfromportand a pitchof
30 degreesfromthe centerlineof thepayloadbay. The ICBCwas controlledfrom
the crewcompartmentusingtheenhancedGet Away Special(GAS)autonomous
payloadcontroller(GAPC)whichcontrolledthe cameraoperationat twospeeds
(HIat 24 framesper secondand LO at 3 framesper second).
The IMAX cabin camera was operated from the middeck, and the camera was used to
film scenes of HST activities, crew activities, and some Earth scenes. Within
24 hours of landing, the IMAX cabin camera was offloaded, and the film was
rushed to a laboratory for developing. Appendix C contains a more in-depth
discussion of the IMAX camera operations and results.
AIR FORCE MAUl OPTICAL SITE
The Air Force Maui Optical Site (AMOS) was unable to acquire any tracking of the
Space Shuttle because of cloud cover at the ground site.
VEHICLE PERFORMANCE
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER/REDESIGNEDSOLID ROCKET MOTOR
All SRB subsystems performed properly during the prelaunch testing and countdown
for the first launch attempt. Data analysis following this launch attempt
showed discrepancies in the APU gas generator bed temperatures between the
primary and secondary temperature measurements on both SRBs. Subsequent
investigation revealed that these measurements were miswired in the Mobile
Launch Platform (MLP). A workaround was implemented for the second launch
attempt to provide better heater control, which occurred.
All SRB systems performed as expected during the second countdown. The SRB
prelaunch countdown was normal, and no SRB or RSRM Launch Commit Criteria (LCC)
or Operational Maintenance Requirements Specification Document (OMRSD)
violations occurred.
Field joint heaters operated for I0 hours 50 minutes. The total activationtime
includingthe scrubbedlaunch attemptwas 25 hours II minutes. Power was
applied to the heating elementan averageof 26 percentof the time to maintain
the field-jointtemperaturesin their normal operatingrange.
Igniter joint heaters operated for 17 hours 50 minutes. The total activation
time including the scrubbed launch attempt was 36 hours 43 minutes. Power was
applied to the heating elements an average of 50 percent of the time to maintain
the igniter-joint temperatures in their normal operating range.
For this flight, the low flow-rate heated ground purge in the SRB aft skirt was
used to maintain the caselnozzle joint and flexible bearing temperatures within
LCC ranges. At L-25 minutes, the purge was changed to high flow rate to inert
the SRB aft skirt.
Data in the followingtable indicate that the flight performanceof both RSRMs
was well within the allowableperformanceenvelopesand was typicalof the
performanceobserved on previous flights. The RSRM propellantmean bulk
temperature(PMBT)was 72°F at liftoff.
This RSRM set (360L023) experienced a tailoff thrust imbalance of 47 percent of
the specification limit, and this was the largest thrust imbalance experienced
on any motor set during the Space Shuttle Program. This imbalance has been
attributed to a burn-rate difference between the forward and center segments on
8
.-- RSRM PROPULSIONPERFORMANCE7 "
Parameter Left motor, 80°F RiGht motor, 80°F
" Predicted Actual Predicted Actual
Impulsega_es
1-20,106ibf-sec 64.96 64.72 64.81 64.89
1-60,106Ibf-sec 173.47 172.09 173.13 173.03
I-AT, 10 ibf-sec 296.59 295.64 296.56 296.29
Vacuum Isp, ibf-sec/ibm 268.60 267.50 268.50 268.10
Burn rate, in/sec @ 60°F 0.3659 0.3647 0.3654 0.3654
at 625 psia
Burn rate, in/sec@ 72°F 0.3691 0.3677 0.3686 0.3684
at 625psia
Event times, seconds
Ignition interval 0.232 N/A 0.232 N/A
Web timea 110.8 111.7 iii.0 110.7
Separationcue, 50 psia 120.6 120.9 120.9 121.4
Action timea 122.7 123.2 123.0 123.9
Separationcommand 125.5 126.7 125.8 126.7
PMBT, OF 72.00 72.00 72.00 72.00
s Maximum ignitionrise rate, 90.4 N/A 90.4 N/A
psia/10ms
Decay time, seconds 2.8 3.0 2.8 3.3
(59.4 psia to 85 K)
Tailoff imbalanceImpulse Predicted Actua_
differential,KLBF-sec NIA 876.6"
Note:
a All times are referencedto ignitioncommandtime except where noted by the
letter a. Those items are referencedto lift-offtime (ignitioninterval).
b Impulse imbalance= left motor - right motor
the right-handmotor. During preflightpreparationof this motor set, the
right-handforwardsegment (RSRM-23)was found to have propellantchips in the
inhibitor. As a result, the segmentwas exchangedwith a forwardsegmentcast
with raw materialsfor a differentset of motors (RSRM-37).
Both SRBs were separatedfrom the ExternalTank (ET)at T + 126.4 seconds,and
reports from the recoveryarea indicatedthat the decelerationsubsystems
performedas designed. Both SRBs were observedduring descentand were returned
after recoveryto Cape Canaveraland in turn, KennedySpace Center for
disassemblyand refurbishment.
During the postflightinspectionof the RSRM set, a small sectionof cork
-_ (0.5 inch axial by 2.0 inchescircumferentialby 0.2 inch radial)was missing
_ from the forwardedge of the aft ground environmentinstrumentation(GEI) run at
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the station 1099, 220 ° location on the forward center segment of the right-hand ---_
motor. Medium to heavy soot was observed on the remaining surface indicating
the loss occurred before splashdown. The cork-to-case bond remained intact as
evidenced by cork cohesive failure. These observations indicate the cork run
was impacted by an unknown object. As a result, an integration.in-flight
anomaly(FlightProblemSTS-61-I-01)has beenopened.
EXTERNAL TANK
ET performancewas excellent,and all objectivesand requirementsassociated
with ET propellantloadingand flightoperationswere met. All ET electrical
equipmentand instrumentationoperatedsatisfactorily. ET purge and heater
operationswere monitoredand all performedproperly. No ET LCC or OMRSD
violationswere identified.
Typical ice/frost formations were observed on the ET during the countdown.
There was no observed ice or frost on the acreage areas of the ET. Normal
quantities of ice or frost were present on the L09 and LH_ feedlines and on the
pressurization brackets. These observations are _cceptable per NSTS 08303. The
Ice/Frost "Red Team" reported that no anomalous thermal protection system (TPS)
conditions existed on the vehicle. However, a single crack in the TPS occurred
where the foam bridges between the vertical strut cable tray and fitting
fairing. The crack is a recurring TPS defect caused by joint rotation during
tanking and is not a problem.
The ET pressurization system functioned properly throughout engine start and
flight. The minimumLO2 ullagepressureexperienceduringtheullagepressure _
slumpwas 14.0 psid.
The postflight ET impact occurred approximately 74 nmi. uprange of the preflight
predicted point.
SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE
All SSME parameters were normal throughout the prelaunch countdown and were
typical of prelaunch parameters observed on previous flights. Engine "ready"
was achieved at the proper time, all LCC were met, and engine start and thrust
buildup were normal.
SSME performance during ascent was nominal with all Interface Control Document
(ICD) and shutdown transient requirements met. Flight data indicate that SSME
performance during mainstage, throttling, shutdown and propellant dump
operations was normal. High pressure oxidizer turbopump (HPOTP) and high
pressure fuel turbopump (HPFTP) temperatures appeared to be well within
specification throughout engine operation. SSME cutoff occurred at
T + 511.28 seconds. There were no failures or sig,ificant SSME problems noted
during the flight.
The data review revealed some items of note which are discussed in the following
paragraphs.
The SSME 2 hot gas injection pressure measurement froze at engine start plus
270 seconds. The phenomenon has been observed previously and is attributed to
ice formation in the sensing line.
I0
_ The SSME 1 main-fuel-valveskin-temperaturemeasurementswere slow to respond to
the liquid temperaturesduring ascent. These measurementshave been trending
downwardfor the last two flightsand are believedto be an indicationthat the
gauges are becomingdebonded. As a result,the gaugeswill be replacedduring
the next flow of this engine.
The SSME 2 HPOTP had an apparentrotor slow-downat engine cutoffplus
2.1 seconds that recovered0.7 second later. This phenomenonhas been observed
before on other pumps during ground testingwith the cause being attributedto
interstageseal rub. Post-testinspectionsand torquechecksof these pumps
were acceptableand all of these pumps accumulatedadditionalhot-fire time plus
flightswith no other anomalies.
Review of the SSME 2 chambercoolantvalve actuator (CCVA)checkoutmodule data
indicatesan upward trend of the channelA - channelB positiondifferential.
The data indicatethat if the trend continues,the CCVA could violate the
checkout limit (1.5 percent)during the next set of checkouts. The flightlimit
is 3 percent. The recommendationhas been made to remove the actuatorfor
analysis. The CCVA was acceptablefor flightsince it has been very repeatable
when chilled. The CCVA performancewas the same during this flightas on
previous flights.
SHUTTLERANGE SAFETY SYSTEM
Analysisof the flight data indicatesnominalperformanceof the SRSS. Shuttle
Range Safety System (SRSS)closed-looptestingwas completedas scheduledduring
F the launch countdown. All SRSS safe and arm (S&A)deviceswere armed and system
inhibitsturned off at the appropriatetimes. All SRSS measurementsindicated
that the system operatedas expectedduring the countdownas well as the flight.
As planned, the SRB S&A deviceswere safed, and SRB power was turnedoff prior
to SRB separation. Also, the ET systemremainedactive until ET separationfrom
theOrbiter.
The telemetry data indicated that the received signal strength of all five SRSS
integrated receiver decoders (IRDs) was always sufficiently high to maintain
system operation to SRB separation. After SRB separation, the ET signal
strength exceeded the Range Safety minimum requirement of -85 dBm for a duration
of 1 second at liftoff plus 386 seconds. The lowest observed ET signal strength
was -101.8 dBm. However, the ET IRD bench test data show a command sensitivity
of -112.6 dBm and confirm that the ET IRD would have processed commands from SRB
separation to ET separation.
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMS
Main Propulsion System
The overall performance of the MPS was as expected with no in-flight anomalies
noted. L09 and LH9 loading were performed as planned with no stop-flows or
reverts. No OMRSD-or LCC violations occurred.
The loading for the first launch attempt was nominal. However, the LH2
5-percent sensor flashed dry for about 2 minutes as detanking was nearlng
_P- completion. It then indicated wet for 30 minutes even though the low-level
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cutoff sensors showed dry. The sensor performed nominally during the second
tanking and during ascent. Postflight troubleshooting has noted no Orbiter MPS "-'_
anomalies.
Throughout the period of preflight operations for the second launch attempt, no
significant hazardous gas concentrations were detected. The maximum hydrogen
concentration level in the Orbiter aft compartment, which occurred shortly after
the start of the LH_ reclrculation pumps, was approximately 126 ppm (corrected).
This value compares-favorably with previous data for this vehicle.
The LH^ loading operations were normal through chilldown, slow-fill, fast-fill,
topping and replenish. Based on an analysis of loading system data, the LH2
load at the end of replenish was 231,793 ibm. Compared to the inventory
(predicted) load of 231,853 Ibm, this assessment yields a difference of
-0.03 percent, which is well within the required HPS loading accuracy of
± 0.37 percent.
The LO^ loading operations were normal through chilldown, slow-fill, fast-fill,
toppln_ and replenish. Based on an analysis of loading system data, the LO2
load at the end of replenish was 1,387,542 Ibm. Compared to the inventory
(predicted) load of 1,387,828 Ibm, this assessment yields a difference of
-0.02 percent, which is well within the required HPS loading accuracy of
+ 0.43 percent.
Ascent MPS performance was completely normal. Data indicate that the LO2 and
LH_ pressurization systems performed as planned, and that all net positive
suStion pressure (NPSP) requirements were met throughout the flight. The
gaseous hydrogen (GH_) flow control valves (FCVs) performed nominally with eight
cycles on FCV 1 and 2 and 42 cycles on FCV 3.
One NPS-unique configuration change was instituted for STS-61. The HPS L02
bleed check valves were redesigned and flown for the first time. The sprxng
between the flappers was replaced with a 30-degree wedge. All three valves
performed nominally and closed within I0 seconds as verified by all L09 inlet
pressures. This valve configuration is presently being installed on all
vehicles.
During entry, helium consumption was 57.4 ibm, which is well within the
experience base. The L09 bleed valves again performed nominally with all valves
being closed within I0 s_conds.
Reaction Control Subsystem
The RCS performed satisfactorily. Propellant consumption was 4981.1 Ibm. The
HST reboost maneuver was 61 seconds in duration and was performed with forward
RCS thrusters FIF, F2F, F3D, and F4D at 343:02:26 G.m.t. (06:16:59 MET).
One in-flight anomaly occurred when thruster L2U failed off at
338:02:34:20 G.m.t. (01:17:07:20 MET) during the height adjust (NH) maneuver
(Flight Problem STS-61-V-03). Thruster L2U was deselected by the RM at the
tlme and remained deselected for the remainder of the mission. Injector t
temperatures did drop, although less than normal for a full-valve opening,
showing both oxidizer and fuel flow. Additionally, the temperatures did not _._
rise above the prefiring temperature, which normally occurs when combustion
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takes place, and this agrees with the indication of no chamber pressure. Due tof-_
the TFL being used at the time, L2U was in a group of thrusters with a downlist
data rate of only one sample/second. As a result, data indicating the actual
pressure was not captured.
Orbital Maneuvering Subsystem
The OMS performance was satisfactory with six straight-feed firings performed;
four with both engines and two with one engine. Total firing time was
603.0 seconds for the left engine and 600.7 seconds for the right engine. A
total of 23,048 ibm of propellants was consumed during the mission.
No OMS-1 maneuver was required. The 201.4-second OMS-2 maneuver provided a
differential velocity (AV) of 324.3 ft/sec. During the early part of the
firing, the left OMS total fuel quantity indication suddenly shifted downward to
44.6 percent following the lockout period (Flight Problem STS-61-V-04). Later
in the mission during the coelliptic rendezvous maneuver (NSR), the quantity
indication returned to proper operation. The indication continued to operate
nominally for the remainder of the mission. A similar anomaly occurred on two
previous missions, and the anomaly was traced to a damaged wire at pin i of the
forward fuel probe electronics connector.
The following table shows pertinent details of the six OMS firings.
OMS Engine Time, G.m.t.IMET Firing AV
firing used duration, ftlsec
i-f
: sec
2 Both 336:10:10:30.2G.m.t. 201.4 324.3
00:00:43:30.2MET
3 Both 336:14:54:28.9G.m.t. 59.2 98.0
(NC-I) 00:05:27:28.9MET
4 Both 337:13:10:59.7G.m.t. 30.0 49.8
(NSR) 01:03:43:59.7MET
5 Left 337:13:44:14.3G.m.t. 17.1 14.1
(NC-2) 01:04:17:14.3MET
6 Right 338:03:22:30.1G.m.t. 14.8 12.1
(NC-3) 01:17:55:30.1MET
Deorbit Both 347:04:14:45.2G.m.t. 295.3 523.4
10:18:47:45.2MET
During the NCI rendezvousmaneuver (one second after ignition),the right OMS
helium tank pressure indication(V43P5122C)droppedfrom 3550 psia to 130 psia
(FlightProblem STS-61-V-02). This tank has a redundantsensor for this
measurement,and data from that measurementwere good. At 338:03:21G.m.t.
f-- (01:17:51MET), just prior to the NC3 rendezvousmaneuver,the indicationwas
restoredwhen the right OMS helium isolationvalveswere opened. The
measurementcontinuedto operateproperlyfor the remainderof the mission.
13
Power Reactant Storage and Distribution Subsystem
The performanceof thepowerreactantstorageand distribution(PRSD)subsystem
was nominalwith no knownoperationalproblems.A totalof 2679 Ib of oxygen
was used during the mission with 159 ib of that total being used for crew
breathing. A total of 317 ib of hydrogen was used by the fuel cells for
electrical power generation. The Orbiter landed with 1219 ib of oxygen and
135 ib of hydrogen remaining in the system. A 94-hour mission extension at the
average power level of 14.1 kW was possible with the reactants remaining at
landing. STS-61 was the first flight of the fifth tank set on this vehicle.
Tank sets 4 and 5 were depleted to residual quantities. Tank set 5 was equipped
with its own cryogenic control box and a heater control pressure transducer for
each tank, thus allowing independent heater operation for tank set 5.
Fuel Cell Powerplant Subsystem
The three fuel cells performed nominally throughout the mission with 3,666 kwh
of electrical energy at an average power level of 14.1 kW and average load of
460 amperes being produced. A total of 2520 ib of oxygen and 317 ib of hydrogen
was used by the fuel cells during the mission, and 2837 Ib of water were
produced as the by-product.
Five fuel cell purges were performed, and these occurred at approximately 15,
86, 159, 231, and 252 hours MET. The actual fuel cell voltages at the end of
the mission were 0.I volt above the predicted value for fuel cells 1 and 3, and
0.15 volt above the predicted value for fuel cell 2.
The leakage signature of the check valve in the fuel cell 2 alternate water line
was the same as observed on STS-54 and STS-57. Following both prior instances
of this problem, the water line check valves were tested for proper crack and
reseat pressures and all were within specification.
Auxiliary Power Unit Subsystem
The APUs met all requirements during the missionl however, three anomalies were
noted and these are discussed in the final paragraphs of this section. The
following table shows the run times for each APU as well as the fuel consumption
for each APU.
APU 1 (SIN 204) APU 2 (SIN 311) APU 3 (SIN 410)
Flight Phase Time, Fuel Time, Fuel Time, Fuel
min:sec consumption, min:sec consumption, min:sec consumption,
ib Ib Ib
Ascent 21:47 53 21:30 60 21:59 51
FCS checkout 04:38 13
Entrya 6=:08 123 94:11 203 62:09 122
Totala'b 88:33 189 115:41 263 84:08 173
Notes:
a APU's 1, 2, and 3 ran for 18 minutes, 39 secondsafter landing.
b Totals includeascent,FCS checkout,entry, and a hydraulicloads test
after landing.
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STS-61 was the first flight in which a crew procedure change was implemented
f that moved the APU tank/fuel llne water system heater activation to Just after
APU shutdownfollowingascent. This changewas madeto preventtestline
temperaturefaultdetectionand annunciation(FDA)violationswhichhave
occurredon severalpreviousflights.Previousheateractivationwas about
one hourafterlaunch.
A review of the upper and lower FDA thermal limits to incorporate the effects of
recent temperature sensor relocations and major modifications to the fuel
isolation valve and APU has been completed. When the proposed limit changes are
approved, these should avoid the potential nuisance alarms and frequent updates
required to change current limits.
The APU 3 X-axis accelerometer data was anomalous during ascent (Flight Problem
STS-61-V-OI). The X-axis acceleration signal output did not represent the true
vibration level of the APU during the last 19 minutes of the 22-mlnute ascent
run. The signal was zero with numerous intermittent spikes primarily in the
O- to 5-g peak-to-peak range. The same signature was seen during entry. The
data review from the acceptance test procedure (ATP) and a confidence run
revealed the same signature, which indicates a problem with the accelerometer or
its wiring in the APU. This APU (S/N 410) does not have a history of high
vibration.
At approximately340:15:15G.m.t.(04:05:48MET),theAPU 2 fuelline,fuel
pump,and gas generatorvalvemodule(GGVM)systemA heatersdid not turnon at
theexpectedcycle-ontemperatureof approximately83OF (FlightProblem
...._ STS-61-V-05).Thebypasslinetemperaturedroppedfrom83°Fto 660Fovera
6-hourperiodandslowedto a steadydecayrateof l°Flhour.ThelowerFDA
limit for thismeasurementis 60°F. The crewswitchedto thesystemB heaterat
341:00:06G.m.t.(04:14:39MET),and properoperationwas observed.To aid in
troubleshooting,theAPU2 fuelline,GGVMandfuelpumpheaterswereswitched
to systemA at 345:04:15G.m.t.(08:18:48MET). The systemA heaterdid not
cycleon, and theAPU 2 bypasslinetemperaturedecreasedto 68°F,wellbelow
the83"F turn-ontemperatureof theheater. Controlwas switchedback to the
B heaters. The problemhas beenisolatedto thethermostat.
FCS checkoutwas performedwith all systemsoperatingnominally.APU 1 was
startedat 346:02:28:37G.m.t.(09:17:01:38MET)and operatedfor4 minutes
38 seconds,consumingapproximately13 ibof fuel.
Duringentry,the APU 3 exhaustgas temperature(EGT)1 datawereerraticfor
23 minutesof the62-minuteentryrun. The data trackedtheEGT 2 slgnature
beforeand aftertheperiodof erraticoperation.
AfterAPUs 1 and 2 wereshutdownfollowinglanding,an apparentlyexcessiveand
oscillating hydraulic load was seen imposed on APU 3 during its last six seconds
of operation. The excessive load was observed from the APU chamber pressure.
The high loading began after APU 1 was shut down when the system 1 hydraulic
load was switched to system 3. This APU signature is typical of high loads, but
the source of the apparently excessive loading is being analyzed. This anomaly
is discussed in more detail in the Hydraulics section of this report.
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HTdraulics/WaterSpray Boiler SubsTstem _.
Subsystemperformanceduring the missionwas nominal. During ascent,WSB 2 had
a momentaryfreeze-up,which allowed the lubrication(lube)oil in APU 2 to
reach 286.6°Fprior to the initiationof WSB 2 spray cooling. The WSB
specificationrequiresspray initiationprior to the lube oil temperature
reaching275°F. The initiationof coolingwas followedby a momentary
over-coolingdown to 212.8°Fbecauseof the normal delay in the controllergoing
from high spray rate to normal spray rate as the controllerwas attemptingto
compensatefor the initialover-temperaturecondition. Followingthese events,
the WSB performednominallyfor the remainderof the mission.
Also during ascent,WSB 3 lube oil outlet temperaturereached261°F prior to the
initiationof cooling. This was not consideredan over-temperaturecondition.
However, once sprayingstarted,an over-coolto 229°F occurred. This is
consideredan over-coolgiven the relativelylow lube oil outlet temperatureat
which coolingstarted. The WSB performednominallyafter the over-cool
conditioncleared.
During the post-ascentbakeoutperiod, the WSB 1 systemA vent heater
temperaturesignaturewas erratic. After severalcycles,a switchwas made to
the system B heater. Performanceof the B heaterwas nominal. It is possible
that ice in the nozzle was causing the erraticresponseon the A heater. The
last cycle of the system A heater after the heaterwas turnedoff, but prior to
system B control,appearednominal. The system A heaterswere used for flight
control system checkout and nominal performancewas observed. The erratic
performanceobserved earlierin the missionhas been attributedto ice buildup __.
and removal from the vent.
FCS checkoutwas performedwith all systemsoperatingnominally. APU 1 was
startedat 346:02:28:37G.m.t. (09:17:01:38MET). Hydraulicsystem 1
performancewas also nominal. WSB coolingwas not required,due to the short
APU run time.
After landing,a satisfactoryhydraulicloads test was performedbefore APU
shutdown,althoughan unusuallyhigh load was noted on APU 3 during the APU
shutdown (FlightProblem STS-61-V-13). This high load appearedwhen the no. 1
pitch actuatorswitched from system 1 to system 3 followingAPU 1 shutdown. A
spike was noted in system 3, followedby erraticpressurewhen no. 1 pitch
actuatorswitched. Simultaneously,system 3 SSHE return accumulatorpressure
increasedfrom IIO psia to 177 psia. In addition,the brake pressureon two
modulesshowed increasedpressure (166 to 193 psia). Postflighttestinghas
identifiedthe cause of the conditions. At the time when these conditionswere
present, the SSMEs were being driven to the rain drain position. The SSHE 1
thrustvector control (TVC) actuatorwas againstits hardstop becauseof the
presence of a +I0" retractioncommmandand the additionalretractionof 0.8°
caused by thermalgradients. When APU 1 was shut down, the actuatorswitched to
hydraulicsystem 3 and went into the "chatter"mode. This mode occurs normally
when an actuator is lightlyinto the hardstop. While operatingin the "chatter"
mode, the actuator power spool oscillatesat approximately50 Hertz, allowing
hydraulic fluid to pass from the supply to return. The hydraulicflow rate can
be increasedas much as 18 gallons/minutein this mode.
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f--. Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystem
The electrical power distribution and control (EPDC) subsystem performed
nominally throughout the mission. The data review and analysis of every
available EPDC measurement revealed no problems or anomalies.
Environmental Control and Life Support System
The environmental control and life support system (ECLSS) operated
satisfactorily in meeting all mission requirements.
The atmospheric revitalizationsystem (ARS) performed nominally throughout the
duration of the flight. No anomalies were reported; however, when cabin
pressure was decreased to 10.2 psia, a lower than previously experienced IMU fan
_P was observed.
It was noted early in the flight that inertial measurement unit (IMU) fan B was
operating at a pressure approximately 0.1 inch of water lower than the last
flight with the data toggling between a differential pressure (_P) of 2.97 and
3.00 inches of water, which is the lower limit for this fan. The fan typically
operates at a _P of 3.1 inches of water when at a cabin pressure of 10.2 psia.
The crew was asked to switch to fan C and the resulting _P was 3.08 to
3.11 inches of water. Normal operation is to use fan B and only operate fans A
and C during the redundant checkout. The IMU filters were cleaned and this did
not improve the _P from fan B. Based on the available data, fan B operation was
not degraded. The lower-than-expected _P is adequately explained by changes to
f the flowpathimplementedto supportthenew HAINSIMUs. The crewswitchedback/
to fan B after cabin repressurization.
The ARS avionics bays water coldplate outlet temperatures peaked at 85°F in bay
I, 89.2°F in bay 2, and 77.8°F in bay 3. The avionics bays I, 2, and 3 air
outlet temperatures peaked at 101.5°P, 101.5°F, and 84.5°F, respectively.
The atmospheric revitalization pressure control system (ARPCS) system performed
normally throughout the duration of the mission. During the redundant component
checkout, the pressure control configuration was switched to the alternate
system. Both systems exhibited normal operation. At 337:04:34 G.m.t.
(00:19:07 MET), the cabin was depressurized to 10.2 psia to support the planned
EVAs. The cabin was repressurized to 14.7 psla at 345:06:46 G.m.t.
(08:21:19 MET).
The new configuration oxygen partial-pressure sensors exhibited outstanding
performance throughout the flight. The maximum differential seen between any
two of the sensors was 0.06 psia, and normally the indicated difference was
0.04 psia.
The active thermal control subsystem (ATCS) operation was satisfactory
throughout the mission. The radiator cold-soak provided cooling during entry
through touchdown-plus-9-minutes when ammonia boiler system A was activated
using the primarylgeneral purpose computer (GPC) controller. This was the first
flight of this ammonia boiler system (ABS) unit since replacement of the leaking
heat exchanger, and the unit controlled the Preon temperatures to 36 °F.
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After landing, the consumables in tank A lasted 42 minutes before the crew ---_,
switched to Tank B. System B, using the secondary controller, maintained the
Freon temperature at 35 °F during its 14 minutes of operation before ground
cooling was activated.
At 337:09:59 G.m.t. (01:00:32 MET), the flash evaporator system (FES) shutdown
in the topping mode. Although the lack of instrumentation prevents a definite
explanation, it is believed that the FES experienced an under-temperature
shutdown as the radiator panels cooled down and the radiator flow controller
reached its temperature control band. The FES operated nominally for the
remainder of the mission.
The supply water and waste management systems performed nominally throughout the
mission. Supply water was managed through the use of the FES and the overboard
dump systems. The supply water dump line temperature was maintained between
70°F and 99°F throughout the mission with the operation of the line heater. The
waste water dump line temperature was maintained between 53°F and 80°F
throughout the mission. The vacuum vent line temperature was maintained between
56°F and 81°F, while the nozzle was between 115°F and 190°F.
Two supply water dumps were performed at a cabin pressure of 10.2 psia with
excellent results. The tanks were pressurized for the first dump, resulting in
an average dump rate of 1.45 percentlminute (2.4 Iblmin). The second supply
water dump was performed at 345:03:26:00 G.m.t. (08:17:59:00 MET) as part of
Development Test Objective (DTO) 1211 with the tanks vented to the lO.2-psia
cabin pressure. This dump resulted in an average dump rate of 0.84
percentlminute (1.38 iblmin) while maintaining an excellent spray profile as _'-_
viewed on the video.
Waste water was gathered at about the predictedrate. Four waste water dumps
were performed,wlth the first three at an averagedump rate of
1.79 percentlminute(2.95 ib/min). The fourthwaste dump, which was performed
serially with the second supply water dump, was a part of DTO 1211 as discussed
in the previous paragraph,and the dump rate was 1.16 percentlminute
(1.92 iblmin). The waste tank bladderexpanded from and indicationof
69 percentof full to an indicationof 79 percentwhen depressurized.
The waste collectionsystem performedadequatelythroughoutthe mission.
During a WCS commode cycle at 345:04:53G.m.t. (08:19:26MET), cabin dPldT
measured -0.040 psilmin for 2.5 minuteswhile at 10.2-psiacabin pressure (which
correspondsto approximately40 Ibmlhr at 14.7 psia) (FlightProblem
STS-61-V-12). This repressurizationlasted approximately70 seconds longer than
a normal WCS/commoderepressurlzation.There was a similaroccurrenceduring a
subsequentcommode cycle at 345:15:34G.m.t. (09:06:07MET) with the cabin at
14.7 psia. In both cases, the leakagestoppedwhen the crew proceededthrough
normal WCS use per the cue card. The crew was advisedabout the abnormal
signature,and no furtheroccurrenceswere observed. Symptomsare consistent
with repressurizationstart prior to full vacuum shutoffcausinga
larger-than-normalvolume of air to flow. This conditioncan be caused by slow
operationof the WCS commodecontrolhandle.
o_-.
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f-- Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression System
The smoke detection system showed no indications of smoke generation during the
entire duration of the mission. Use of the fire suppression system was not
required.
Airlock Support System
The airlock depressurization valve was used to reduce the cabin pressure to
10.2 psia for the five planned EVAs. All five EVAs were performed from the
airlock with no reported anomalies. The active system monitor parameters
indicated normal output throughout the mission.
Avionics and Software Subsystems
The integrated guidance, navigation and control (IGNC) system performed
nominally during ascent, on-orbit, and entry. Likewise nominal operations were
indicated for the periods of HST capture, HST berthing to the FSS at 90 degrees,
HST attached with the FSS at 45 degrees, solar array jettison, HST reboost, and
HST deploy. The dynamics during the reboost maneuver supports the existence of
a 2-degree error in -X thrust vector that is stated in the Shuttle Operational
Data Book (SODB).
The IGNC operation during HST rendezvous was satisfactory based on crew comments
and target state vectors, as well as reaching the V-Bar (position on the
target's velocity vector with relative rates nulled) with less than planned
io- fuel consumption. The height adjust/phaslng (NHINC) ground-targeted maneuvers
were executed yielding the expected results. The maneuver to the -Z target
track was also nominal along with the two star tracker passes prior to the
corrective combination (NCC) maneuver. After ignition (TIG) for the NCC
maneuver, the rendezvous radar locked on to the target and the subsequent radar
sensor pass was nominal. The terminal phase initiation (TI) maneuver was
executed with the expected results. All of the mldcourse correction maneuvers
were small and were executed within the expected parameters. Manual operations
following ignition for the fourth midcourse correction (MC4) maneuver up through
reaching V-Bar were performed according to procedures.
The flight control system (FCS) performance was nominal throughout the mission.
The channel i, 2, and 3 secondary differential pressures for the right inboard
elevon actuator (channel 4 was depinned because of the failure of the
transducer) indicated nominal performance for this aerosurface. FCS checkout
was performed with all systems operating nominally. APU i was started at
346:02:28:37 G.m.t. (09:17:01:38 MET) and operated for 4 minutes 38 seconds
during the checkout.
Overall performance of the IMU ship set was satisfactory on this first flight of
three High Accuracy Inertial Navigation System (RAINS) IMUs. Gyrocompass
performance data from all preflight IMU alignments were within specified limits.
Remaining launch hold-time based on IMU performance was unlimited. The maximum
alignment errors at liftoff were 10 arc seconds in the A and B axes and
30 arc seconds in the C axis. No uplinked changes of the gyro drift were
required during the mission, and only one uplink was required for accelerometer
_ compensation. Both of these conditions are indicative of good IMU stability.
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The -Z imagedissectortube(IDT)star trackerperformancewas nominal, o--.
However,the-Y solid-statestar tracker(SSST)(S/N002)performancewas not
totallysatisfactoryas theunit failedto acquirestarsforapproximately
fivehoursbetween340:20:00G.m.t.(04:10:33MET)and 341:01:00G.m.t.
(04:15:51:10MET) (FlightProblemSTS-61-V-06).At 341:01:18:10G.m.t.
(04:16:09:10MET),a seriesof threestar-trackerself-testsfailed. At
341:01:22:56G.m.t.(04:15:55:56MET),the startrackerwas poweredoff for
I0 seconds. Followingthe powercycle,the startrackersuccessfullypassedan
on-orbitself test,and theunit functionednominallyfor the remainderof the
mission. Therehave beenno previousfailuresof a solid-statestar tracker,
and neithertype(SSSTor IDT)star trackerhas everfailedto acquire
navigationstars. Initialindicationsare thata single-event-upset(SEU)
occurredbecauseof thehigh radiationlevelsat the altitudeflown,and the
SSSTis moresusceptibleto SEUs thantheIDT startracker.
The dataprocessingsystem(DPS)hardwareand softwareperformednominally.
The displaysand controlsmet all requirementsof themission;however,minor
problemswerenoted. The crewreportedduringpostsleepactivitieson flight
day 4 thatthe aft missiontimercircuitbreaker(CBI2on panel015)was in the
open (tripped)position(FlightProblemSTS-61-V-07).The specificationlists
themaximumdc powerrequiredby the timeras 4 watts(0.14amperesat 28 Vdc),
and the timeris theonlyhardwareconnectedto thiscircuitbreaker. The timer
is not instrumented,and fuelcell2 currentdatadoesnot conclusivelyshow
when the 3-amperebreakertripped. Failurehistoryof the timerdoesnot
indicateany pasthigh-currentproblemsthatwouldtripa breaker. The decision
was made to not resetthe circuitbreaker,althoughdata indicatedthata hard
shorthad not occurred.This lossdidnot affectmissionoperations.
The Ku-bandrendezvousradarrangerate/azimuthindicatorunitdigitdidnot
illuminate(FlightProblemSTS-61-V-08).This anomalywas notedduringKu-band
antennastowagepriorto thedeorbitmaneuver;consequently,the lossof this
indicator did not impact the mission.
The starboardaft payloadbay floodlightfailedduringpayloadbay doorclosure
(FlightProblemSTS-61-V-11).ThislighthadworkednominallyduringtheEVA
portionsof themission. As a result,thelossof thislightdid not impactthe
missionin any manner.
Communicationsand Trackin_SubsTstem
The communicationsand trackingsubsystemperformednominallythroughout he
mission. Someminorproblemswerenotedwith the closedcircuittelevision
(CCTV)cameras,and theseare discussedin the followingparagraphs.
The CCTVcameraA lensbecamestuckin thezoomed-inposition.Attemptsby the
groundcontrollersto unstickthe lenswere unsuccessful.The camerawas
allowedto warmupand the powerwas cycledand thecamerabeganoperating
normally.Laterin themission,thecamerazoomcapabilitywas againlost,and
thecamerawas allowedto warm up and it operatedproperly.
The RHS elbowcameraexhibitedred/blue/greenspotsat low-lightconditions.
Thesespotsdid not impactcameraoperationsor camerausefulness.
2O
f--. The master timing unit (MTU) built-in test equipment (BITE) word was observed to
! toggle at irregular intervals, lasting for periods of from 1 to 4 seconds. The
togglingbitindicatesan excessivefrequencydifferencebetweenthetwoMTU
oscillators.No driftwas observedbetweeneitherof theMTU1or MTU2 timesand
thegroundsiteG.m.t. The causeof thisproblemis believedto be theresult
of over-sensitive BITE circuitry and/or higher-than-average drift between
oscillators.The problemhad no impacton themission.
OperationalInstrumentation/ModularAuxiliaryDataSystem
The operationalinstrumentationa d modularauxiliarydatasystem(MADS)
operatednominallythroughouthemission. Someminorproblemswerenotedand
are discussedbelow,but noneof theseimpactedthemission.
An apparentone-timefailurein thelogiccircuitryof operationsrecorder2
occurredat 343:03:31G.m.t.(06:18:04MET). Thisproblemis discussedin the
GFE sectionof thisreport.
At 345:04:32G.m.t.(08:19:05MET),in preparationforrecordingtheglobal
positioningsystem(GPS)DTO (700-8)data,the (MADS)was poweredup. The MADS
recorderBITE indicationfailedto go from "FAIL" to "GOOD"when therecorder
andmasterpowerwereswitchedon (FlightProblemSTS-61-V-10).TheBITE
changedto "GOOD"afterthe "W-B-ON"and "PCM-0N"commandsweresent. Subsequent
operationsof the recorderwerenominal. Duringpostflightcrewdebriefings,
the crewreportedthatthe onboardswitchhad not beenplacedin thecorrect
position.
_f
Structures and Mechanical Subsystems
The structures and mechanical subsystems performed nominally throughout the
mission. No problems were noted; however, the port and starboard payload bay
door system 2 drive motors exceeded the File IX in-flight checkout requirement
of 63 seconds maximum with drive times of 65 and 66 seconds, respectively.
The inboard tire of the right main gear showed tread wear from the landing. The
landing and braking data are presented in the following table.
During the postflight inspection of the payload bay doors, a clip that is used
to retain the dogbone between the port payload bay door panels 1 and 2 broke
away from the graphitelepoxy retaining angle (Plight Problem STS-61-V-14). The
failure resulted in a 1.25 by 0.5 inch missing section of the angle and an area
of delamination. The broken section is on panel 2 near the centerline. The
retaining angle will be repaired and inspections of all payload bay door
expansion joints will be made.
STS-61was the twelfth flight which used the drag chute. The drag chute was
deployed at 347:05:25:41.4 G.m.t., 4.6 seconds prior to nose gear touchdown.
The air speed at deployment was 167.4 knots equivalent air speed (keas).
Preliminary data indicate nominal drag chute performance, although the chute was
offset to the left of the vehicle approximately 3 degrees as demonstrated with
previous five-ribbon-out chutes. This drag chute was the standard configuration
with five ribbons removed from the canopy. The drag chute was jettisoned at
f-" 347:05:26:07.6 G.m.t., 26.2 seconds after deployment.
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LANDING AND BRAKING PARAMETERS ....
From
Parameter threshold, Speed, Sink rate, ftlsec Pitch rate,
ft keas deglsec
Main gear touchdown 2903 200.9 "1.5 n/a
Nose gear touchdown 6635 149.9 n/a 3.04 ,
Braking initiation speed 120.8 knots (keas)
Brake-on time 34.6 seconds (sustained)
Rolloutdistance 7,911 feet
Rollout time 53.4 seconds
Runway 33 (concrete) at KSC SLF
Orbiterweightat landing 212,828 ib (landingestimate)
Peak
Brake sensor location pressure, Brake assembly Energy,
psla millionft-lb
Left-hand inboard 1 1236 Left-hand outboard 20.64
Left-hand inboard 3 1224 Left-hand inboard 20.21
Left-hand outboard 2 1248 Right-hand inboard 14.23
Left-hand outboard 4 1236 Right-hand outboard 11.59
Right-hand inboard 1 1032
Right-hand inboard 3 1032 _--_
Right-hand outboard 2 996
Right-bend outboard 4 924
Aerodynamics, Heating, and Thermal Interfaces
The ascent and entry aerodynamics were nominal with no problems or anomalies
noted. The aerodynamic and plume heating was nominal during ascent and the
aerodynamic heating during descent was also nominal. The prelaunch analysis of
the thermal interfaces showed no temperatures in excess of limits. In addition,
the gaseous helium and gaseous nitrogen pressures were within limits, and the
aft compartment helium concentration was within the experience base.
Thermal Control Subsystem
The performance of the thermal control subsystem was satisfactory during all
phases of the mission and all Orbiter subsystem temperatures were maintained
within acceptable limits.
At approximately 340:15:15 G.m.t. (04:05:48 MET), the APU 2 fuel line, fuel
pump, and GGVM system A heaters did not turn on at the expected cycle-on
temperature of approximately 83°F. This problem is discussed in the Auxiliary
Power Unit section of this report.
During entry, the APU 3 EGT I data were erratic. The problem is discussed in
greater detail in the Auxiliary Power Unit section of this report.
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_-- Aerothermodynamics
The acreage heating was nominal during entry with all structural temperatures
remaining within limits. Also, the structural temperature rise-rates were
within the experience base, and TPS damage was within the experience base and
less than the average experienced on previous flights.
Thermal Protection Subsystem
The TPS performed satisfactorily throughout the mission based on structural
temperature response data, which indicates average entry heating. The overall
boundary layer transition from laminar flow to turbulent flow occurred
1215 seconds after entry interface on the forward centerline of the vehicle and
1175 seconds after entry interface on the aft centerline of the vehicle. Based
on the data evaluated, the transition was asymmetric from right to left on the
vehicle. Transition occurred at 1170 seconds on the right side of the vehicle
and at 1265 seconds on the left side of the vehicle.
Overall debris damage was below average. The TPS showed debris impact damage at
120 sites, of which 13 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. This total
does not include the numerous hits on the base heat shield attributed to the
flame arrestment sparkler system on the mobile launch platform. A comparison of
these numbers with statistics from 43 previous missions of the same
configuration indicates both the total number of hits and the number of hits one
inch or greater was less than average.
jF Thelowersurfacesustaineda totalof 59hits(flightaverageis 93hits),of
which seven (flight average is 15) had a major dimension of one inch or greater.
The distribution of hits on the lower surface does not suggest a single source
of debris, but rather indicates a shedding of ice and TPS debris from random
sources. The largest tile damage sites measured 5 inches by 1.5 inches by
0.125 inch (right-hand chine area) and 2 inches by 2.5 inches by 0.25 inch deep
(left inboard elevon). The shallow depths of these impact sites indicates
impacts from low-denslty objects.
The chin panel gap filler showed some outer mold line (OML) fraying on the
left-hand outboard side. The gap between the nose cap and chin panel and the
depth of the gap filler were evaluated and accepted for a second flight of that
assembly. This marks the first flight of 0V-105 where no chin panel assembly
will require removal after a flight.
The primary nose landing gear door (NLGD) thermal barrier was in good condition
overall with only one torn patch on the right hinge-line. Several tiles on the
aft edge of both doors had broken tile lips. Overall, eight NLGD tiles were
replaced because of flight damage. The main landing gear door (MLGD) thermal
barriers were in good condition overall.
A cluster of 17 hits near the LH9 ETlOrbiter umbilical was most likely caused by
impacts from higher density materials such as ice. The dome-mounted heat shield
(DMHS) closeout blanket patches on all three SSMEs were in excellent condition
with no material missing. Tiles on the vertical stabilizer stinger and around
the drag chute door were intact and undamaged.
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ET/OrbiterseparationdevicesgO-I,gO-2,and EO-3 functionednominally,and all
ET/Orbiterumbilicalseparationordnanceretentionshutterswere closed
properly.No debriswas foundon the runwaybeneaththe umbilicalcavities.
Orbiterwindows3 and 4 were moderatelyhazed,and onlya lighthazewas present
on the otherwindows. Surfacewipeswere takenof all windowsfor laboratory
analysis,the resultsof whichwillbe publishedin separatedocumentation.
The postlandingwalkdownof the runwayresultedin therecoveryof all drag
chutehardware,whichshowedno signsof abnormaloperation.No organic(bird)
debriswas found,and twoQ-feltplugs,most likelyfromthebaseheat shield
area,were recoveredin thevicinityof thedragchute.
The Shuttlethermalimagerwas used to measuretheOrbiternosecap reusable
carboncarbon(RCC)temperature,whichwas 200 °F nineminutesafterlanding.
Twenty-fourminutesafterlanding,theright-handwingleadingedgepanel9 RCC
was 83 °F and panel17 was 72 °F.
REMOTEMANIPULATORSYSTEM
The RMS was utilizedextensivelyduringthismissionin theretrieval,repair,
and redeploymentoperationsof theHST. The RMS maneuveredtheHST during
retrievaland deployoperations.A suitedcrewmemberusingthemanipulatorfoot
restraint(MFR)was positionedby theRMS duringeachof the fiveEVAs. No RMS
problemsor anomalieswere identified. _-_
Duringpost-insertionactivities,theRMS was initializedwith the roll-outof
themanipulatorpositioningmechanism(MPM),thereleaseof the shoulderbrace
and configurationof thesystemintotheGPC temperaturemonitoringmode. When
the arm was deselected[i.e.,powerto thearm-basedelectronics(ABE)was
removed],an "ABECOHM"messagewas annunciated. The samemessageoccurredon
deselectionof thearm afterRMS initializationon thepreviousflight(STS-57)
of thisarm/manipulatorcontrollerinterfaceunit (MCIU)combination,and
similarcommunicationglitcheshavebeenobservedat armdeselectionon previous
RMS flights. On STS-61,a notewas flownfor thefirsttimein theFlightData
File thatindicatesthat themessagesat arm deselectionshouldbe ignored.
The arm was uncradledfor the firsttimein themissionto performtheRMS
checkoutper thenominalproceduresat approximately337:09:27G.m.t.
(00:18:30MET). All checkoutsignatureswerenominal. Afterthe checkout,the
armwas used to conducta pre-missionplannedCCTVsurveyof the payloadbay and
HST FSS. The arm was cradledat about337:12:30G.m.t.(00:21:30MET).
Cradlingrequiredabout6 minutes30 secondsfromreceivingthe forward
ready-to-latch(RTL)indicationsto receivingtheaft RTL indications.The crew
remarkedthatthe recentlyrevisedRMS trainingtechniqueswerehelpfulin
accomplishingthe cradlingtask.
The RMS was equippedwitha new generationcolorCCTVcameraat theelbow
positionand as a result,severalplannedsurveyswere revisedin real-timeto
takeadvantageof thehigherqualityimagetheelbowcameraprovided.In fact,
at times,arm positionswere modifiedto favortheuse of theelbowcameraover _-_
theblack-and-whiteRMS wristcamera.
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RMS activitiesbegan with the the retrievalof the HST on flightday 3. At
approximately338:06:57G.m.t. (01:21:30MET), the arm was poweredand
maneuveredto the HST-captureposition. Rendezousmaneuverscontinueduntil the
Orbiterwas positionedwithin the arm's reach of an HST grapplefixture.
Grapple occurredat 338:08:46:56G.m.t. (01:23:19:56MET). The.arm/HSTwas
maneuveredto a positiondirectlyabove the FSS, and the HST was berthedin the
FSS 35 minutesafter capture. The three latcheson the FSS were successfully
closedand the HST was releasedby the RMS. CCTV surveysof the HST were
conductedusing the RMS cameras. At the end of each usage, the arm was placed
in a preplannedextended-parkposition to save set-up time prior to the first
EVA.
HST repairactivitiescommencedon flight day 4 with an EVA crewmember-assisted
grappleof the MFR by the RMS end effector(EE). An EVA crewmemberingressed
the MFR at 339:04:05G.m.t. (02:18:38MET). TypicalEVA operationsduring all
five EVAs were performedwith one EVA crewmemberin the MFR on the arm and the
other crewmemberworking from a stationaryportablefoot restraint(PFR) or a
tetheredposition. At times,however,both crewmemberswere translatedon the
end of the arm to reduce repositioningtime betweentasks.
Two times during attempts to close the RSU bay doors, messageswere received
indicatingthat the elbow pitch brake had slippedmore than 0.5 degree. The
messagecan only be receivedwhen the RMS brakes are commandedon. During most
RMS/EVA activities,the brakes were commandedoff and the RMS was in the
position-holdmode. Brakes were commandedon during the RSU door-closingeffort
in an attempt to providea more stable platformfor the MFR-basedcrewmember;
/o however, the crew reportedduring postflightdebriefingsthat the stabilityof
the RMS position-holdmode matched the brakes-onmode, with both modes providing
a good stable operatingbase. The brake-slipmessagewas not unexpectedand no
specialaction was taken in responseto the message. However,subsequentarm
operationsmade less use of the brakes.
After installingthe WF/PC, the arm CCTV cameraswere used to inspectthe WF/PC
edge seals, as planned. During the flightday 7 EVA for replacementof the
COSTAR,and upon the EVA crewmembersinitialmovementinto the MFR, a message
was receivedthat indicateda brake slip at the wrist joint. The crewmemberhad
swiveledat the waist and in stopping,had transferredthe inertiaof the move
into the arm via the MFR. Again, the messagewas not unexpectedand it posed no
problem to the operator.
During flightday 8 activities,the arm was maneuveredfrom extended-parkto a
positionbest suited for monitoringthe HST with the elbow cameraduring the
RCS reboostmaneuver. Followingstowageof the MFR, the RMS was returned to the
park position for deploymentof the HST the followingday.
The HST was grappledwith the RMS end effector (EE)at 344:07:44:14G.m.t.
(07:22:17:14MET). Unberthingmaneuversfollowedimmediatelywith BST release
occurringat 344:10:26:47G.m.t (08:00:59:47MET). The tlp-offrate at HST
releasewas 0.054 deg/sec,and the maximumallowablewas 0.2 deg/sec.
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The final arm use was the pre-plannedRMS CCTV monitoringof the supply and
waste water dumps (DTO 1211) on flight day i0. The arm was poweredup at
345:02:59G.m.t. (08:17:32MET), and the arm was cradledand powereddown at
345:06:20G.m.t. (08:20:53MET). No furtherRMS activitieswere conducted
during the mission.
EXTRAVEHICULARACTIVITY
SUMMARY
All planned activities for the HST servicing mission were completed very
successfully with performance of the five planned EVAs. During these five EVAs,
the EMUs performed exceptionally well with no anomalies related to EMU
performance noted other than those related to the communications. The five EVAs
performed were of the duration shown in the following table. With the
completion of these EVAs, the EMUs have completed over 300 hours of satisfactory
performance.
Extravehicular Time, hr:min:sec
Activity
First (EVI,EV2)* 07:53:58
Second(EV3,EV4)** 06:35:30 /-"
Third (EV1,EV2) 06:47:21
Fourth(EV3,EV4) 06:50:52
Fifth (EVl,EV2) 07:21:00
Total 35:28:41
,
Note: .,EVI- Hoffman,EV2 - Musgrave
* EV3 Thornton,EV4 - Akers '
INITIALPREPARATIONS
Preparationfor EVA began on flight day 1 when the crew cabin was depressurlzed
from 14.7 psia to 10.2 psia. The checkoutof the four EMUs was completedon
flight day 2. All EMU parameterswere within limits except that noise was heard
by EV2 in both communicationsmodes (A and B).
FIRST EXTRAVEHICULARACTIVITY
The first EVA was begun with normal communicationsconfigurationsfor both
crewmemberswith crewmemberEV1 in mode A and crewmemberEV2 in mode B. The
configurationwas acceptableand noise was not heard by the EV2 crewmemberas i_-_
had been heard during EMU checkout. The first EVA of 7 hours 53 minutes
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_ 58 secondsended with all plannedtasks completed. These tasks included
f replacementof the HST RSU 2 and 3 and fuse plugs, changeoutof ECU 1 and 3, and
preparationsfor solar array changeout.
SECONDEXTRAVEHICULARACTIVITY
The second EVA of 6 hours 35 minutes30 secondswas successfullycompletedas
planned. The HST solar arrayswere replacedand an alivenesstest of the arrays
was successfullycompleted. The partiallydeployedsolar array that was removed
was intentionallyjettisonedon-orbit,and the other solar array was stowed for
return to Earth.
Shortlyafter the beginningof the second EVA, duringa status check of the
EMUs, the sublimatoroutlet temperatureon the EV3 EMU was slightlyabove the
freezingpoint of water. At the same time, it was noted that the sublimator
feedwaterpressurewas not risingas expected. EV3 stated that during the
pre-EVAactivity,the feedwaterswitch had been inadvertentlyplaced to the on
positioncausingwater to flow into and throughthe sublimator. As the EMU
approachedvacuum, thiswater froze onto the outsideof the sublimatorand down
the feedvaterline causingthe unexpectedtemperatureand pressurereadings. As
time passed during the EVA, the ice sublimatedaway and the temperatureand
pressurebegan readingnormally.
At the beginningof repressurizationto cabin pressurefollowingthe EVA, the
EV3 crewmemberexperiencedan ear blockage. Consequently,the repressurizatlon
was controlledto a slower than normal rate allowingEV3 to keep her ears clear.
THIRD EXTRAVEHICULARACTIVITY
All planned tasks for the third EVA, which was 6 hours 47 minutes21 secondsin
length,were completed. These tasks includedinstallationof the
Wide-FieldlPlanetaryCamera II (WFIPCII), and the replacementof the MSS -1 and
-2. In additionsome of the easier tasks plannedfor the fourthEVA were also
completed.
FOURTH EXTRAVEHICULARACTIVITY
ThefourthEVA was 6 hours50 minutes52 secondsinduration,andallplanned
tasks were completed. These tasks includedremovalof the HSP for return to
Earth,installationf theCOSTAR,andinstallationf thecoprocessor.EV3
continuedto have intermittentcommunicationsproblemsduring the fourthEVA,
just as experiencedin the second EVA; however,hard-llnecommunicationswere
availablein the airlockduring all pre-EVAoperations. During the periodsof
intermittentcommunications,the EV4 crewmembercould still communicatewlth
EV3, and as a result, the EVA was continuedusing the same communications
protocolas used during the second EVA.
FIFTH EXTRAVEHICULARACTIVITY
The fifth EVA was 7 hours 21 minutes in duration, and all planned tasks were
performed. Tasks performed during this final EVA included replacement of the
SADE, installation of the GHRS redundancy kit, manual deployment of the PDMs of
-I-" both solar arrays and installation of protective enclosures for both MSSs. EV2
once again remained in communications mode A for the duration of the EVA.
27
FLIGHTCREWEQUIPMENT/GOVERNMENTFURNISHEDEQUIPMENT _-_
The flight crew equipment/GFEperformednominally. The followingparagraphs
discuss problems/anomaliesthat were noted.
Prior to the first EVA after filling the EMU in-suitdrink bag for EMU 2, the
bag began leakingfrom the fill port (FlightProblemSTS-61-F-03). An in-fllght
maintenance(IFM) procedurewas used in which the drink straw was insertedinto
the drink port, the straw was bent, and the straw was then taped to the bag.
This IFM was successfulin stopping the leak. After fillingthe second in-suit
drink bag prior to EVA 3, it also began leakingand the IFM was successfully
used to stop that leak. FollowingEVA 4, the crew reported that the bags were
no longer leakingand the IFM was no longernecessary.
Followingthe first EVA, the batterychargingof the expendedEMU batterieswas
initiated;however,one of the two on-chargeindicationlightson the first
mlddeck battery charger (S/N 002) was not illuminated(FlightProblem
STS-61-F-02). These lights indicate that the batteriesare chargingproperly.
The crew switched to the second mlddeckbatterycharger(S/N 001), and all
indicationswere nominal.
At the beginningof the second EVA, as EV3 (Thornton)egressed the airlock,EV3
could no longer receivecommunicationtransmissionsfrom in-cabincrewmembersin
either communicationsmode A or B (FlightProblemSTS-61-F-01). However,EV-3
could still receivecommunicationsfrom EV4 (Akers)in both communicationsmodes
(A and B). As a result, the EVA was continuedwith EV4 relayingmessages to _
EV3. About 3 hours 15 minutes into the EVA, EV3 could receivecommunications
from the Orbiter with no actionshaving been taken by EV3. Near the end of the
EVA, Orbiter communicationswere again lost by EV3. When EV3 switched to
hard-linecommunicationsin the airlock,EV3 was still unable to receive
communicationsfrom the Orbiter. The cause of this anomalyis being
investigated.
During EVA 5, the biomedicalsignal was unavailablefor over 90 percentof the
EVA. Troubleshootingby the crew followingthe EVA showed no loose connections
(FlightProblem STS-61-F-04). Since the normal real-timedata system (RTDS)
data were still available(providingoxygen consumptionand use-ratedata for
calculationof metabolicrate), the decisionwas made to continuethe EVA as
planned.
The CCTV camera B tilt-motionwas hindered by the electricalcable routingon
severaloccasions (FlightProblemSTS-61-F-05). Panning the camera successfully
freed the tilt morion each time the routinginterferedwith the camera motion.
An apparent one-time failurein the logic circuitryof operationsrecorder2
occurredat 343:03:31G.m.t. (06:18:04MET) (FlightProblem STS-61-F-06). When
a series of commandswas sent to the recorder to change record-speedfrom 15 ips
to 24 ips, the recorder speed indicatordiscreteschangedto 24 ips indicating
the commandwas received. However, the logic circuitsfailed to actuallyswitch
the speed of the recorderuntil the recorderwas commandedto stop, change
tracks,and restart about 2.5 hours later. As a result,during a recorder
playback throughthe FM system,with the ground configuredto handle data _---.
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_.-_ recorded at 24 ips, the modulation was unreadable. A subsequent dump to a
ground site configured to handle data recorded at 15 ips was successful. This
problem did not recur.
During the fine guidance sensor bay closure, the HST power tool.abruptly stopped
working (Flight Problem STS-61-F-07). Changing the batteries, as well as
cycling the switches, failed to resolve the problem.
The crew noted that the two large in-suit drink bags were missing (Flight
Problem STS-61-F-08). Investigation by ground personnel revealed that the two
drink bags had not been stowed, and as a result, the two regular size in-suit
drink bags were used alternately by the crewmembers for all five EVAs.
During the depressurization to vacuum while at the 5.0 psia hold, EV2
experienced a failed suit leak check (Flight Problem STS-61-F-09). Standard
procedures allow the crewmember to perform a second leak check if the first
fails. EV2 performed a second leak check successfully and the depressurlzatlon
continued.
CARGOINTEGRATION
The Orbiter-to-cargo integration hardware performed nominally with no anomalies
identified. Immediately prior to flight, an electrical jumper cable was
provided to facilitate a contingency IFH, should the payload
..... interrogator/payload data tnterleaver data inversion problem recur. Nominal
system operations were noted and the cable was not used.
DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES/DETAILED SECONDARY OBJECTIVES
A total of 13 development test objectives (DTOs) and 12 detailed supplementary
objectives (DSOs) were assigned to the STS-61 mission. The results of these
DTOs and DSOs will be documented separately.
DEVELOPMENTTEST OBJECTIVES
DTO 301D - Ascent Structural Capability Evaluation - Data were collected on the
MADS recorder during ascent. The data were given to the sponsor for evaluation.
DTO 305D - Ascent Compartment Venting Evaluation - Data were collected on the
MADS recorder during ascent. The data were given to the sponsor for evaluation.
Plight data show profiles similar to the data from the last three flights of
OV-105 with no data anomalies present.
DTO 306D - Descent Compartment Venting Evaluation - Data were collected on the
MADS recorder during descent. The data were given to the sponsor for
evaluation. Plots of flight data did not show any anomalies.
DTO 307D - Entry Structural Capability -Data were collected on the MADS
recorder during descent. The data were given to the sponsor for evaluation./
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DT0 312 - ET TPS Performance(Methods1 and 2) (No Maneuver)- Photographyfor _
this DTO was obtainedusing the Hasselbladcamerawith a 250-mm lens (method2).
A total of 18 frames of the ET was acquiredby Mission Specialist2. Mission
Specialist3 also attemptedto obtain usable picturesof the ET; however9 this
was not successfulbecauseof the long distance betweenthe ET and Orbiter. The
first time the crew saw the ET was after the Orbiterwas maneuveredto the OMS-2
firing attitude. The normal pitch maneuver immediatelyfollowingET separation
was deleted to conserveRCS propellantsfor the HST operations. The first
picturewas taken at approximately36 minutesMET over easternMozambique,and
the last picturewas taken at approximately39 minutes MET over northern
Madagascar. The ET appearsvery small in all of the picturesbecauseof the
greater distance betweenthe Orbiterand the ET than on most previousmissions.
No anomalieswere visiblefrom the picturesof the ET. A boosterseparation
motor burn scar is visibleon the intertank. The orientationand detailsof the
ET were difficultto see becauseof the great distanceat which the photographs
were taken.
Host of the umbilicalwell photographyof the ET and SRB was not usable because
of the lightingconditionspresentduring the early part of the mission.
DTO 414 - APU Shutdown- After ascent, the APU's were shut down in the order
requested (2, 1, 3) with greater than five secondsbetweeneach APU shut down.
This DTO was performedto aid in determiningwhy an anomaloushydraulicssystem
3 supply pressurehang-up of about 40 secondswas observedwhen APU 3 was shut
down early during ascent on STS-54. The hang-upwas theorizedto have been
caused by back-drivingthe hydraulicsystem 3 rudder speedbrakepower drive
unit (PDU) motor. No rudderlspeedbrakePDU back-drivingwas noted, and all _-._
pressureslope changescorrespond to switchingvalve changes-of-state.
DTO 521 - OrbiterDrag Chute System - The Orbiterdrag chute was deployedas
plannedduring the landingrollout. The sponsorhas reviewed the data and found
no adverseconditions,although the drag chute was offset from the vehicle
centerline about 3 degrees,
DTO 648 - ElectronicStill Camera PhotographyTest - An electronicstill camera
was used extensivelythroughoutthe mission to documentHST anomalies. The
photographyis being evaluated.
DTO 656 - Payload General SupportComputer (PGSC)SingleEvent Upset Monitoring
(Configurationi and 2) - Video from the mission showed the supportingequipment
for this DTO in operation. Data have been given to the sponsorfor analysis.
DTO 667 - PortableIn-FlightLandingOperationsTrainer - The portable in-flight
landingoperations trainer (PILOT)equipmentfor this DTO was exercised
extensivelyby the Commanderand Pilot on the day before entry.
DTO 700-2 - Laser Range and Range Rate Device - The Laser Range and Range Rate
device was used during the HST rendezvousactivities,solar array jettison,and
HST deploymentactivities. The sponsor is evaluatingthe data collectedduring
these operations.
r_
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DTO 700-8 - Global PositioningSystemDevelopmentFlightTest - Data were
collectedon the MADS recorder,and these data have been given to the sponsor
for evaluation. The resultsof the evaluationwill be documentedin separate
publications.
DTO 1211 - Waste and SupplyWater Dump at 10.2 psia - This DTO was completed
and the dumps were video-tapedfor review by ground personnel. The data are
being reviewedby the sponsor,and the resultswill be documentedin a separate
publication.
DETAILEDSUPPLEMENTARYOBJECTIVES
DSO 326 - WindowImpactObservations(Targetof Opportunity)- Observationswere
made for thisDSO. Theseobservationsweregivento the sponsorforanalysis.
DSO 469 - In-FlightRadiationDoseDistribution(ConfigurationI) - Datawere
collectedfromthe two crewmemberoperatorsfor thisDSOwithoutincident.The
dataare used to measurethe radiationenvironmentinsidetheOrbiter,and the
typesof chargedparticlesand theirrespectivenergies.The datahave been
givento thesponsorfor analysis.
DSO 483 - BackPainPatternin Microgravity- Datawere collectedfromall seven
crewmemberswithoutincidentfor thisDSO on non-EVAdays. The datawillbe
used to understandthebackpainpatternand heightchangesas theyoccur
in-flight,as wellas etiologyof backpainas experiencedin microgravity.The
data,whichare in the formof in-flightlogs,havebeengivento the sponsor
foranalysis./
DSO 485 - Inter-MarsTissueEquivalentProportionalCounter(ITEPC)- Datawere
collectedfor thisDSO,and the datahavebeengivento thesponsorfor
analysis.
DSO 487 - ImmunologicalAssessmentof Crewmembers- Datawere collectedfromall
sevencrewmembersfor thisDSO. The datawillbe used to assessthe immune
systemfunctionusingimmunecellsfromthe standardblooddrawscollected
duringthepreflightand postflightphysicalexaminations.The datahave been
givento thesponsorforevaluation.
DS0 489 - EVA DosimetryEvaluation- The datawerecollectedwithoutincident
fromeachof the fourcrewmemberswho performedan EVA. Data fromthisDSOwill
be used to verifythecurrentEVA radiationexposuremeasurementsystem. Each
EVA crewmemberwore a personaldosimeterundertheliquidcoolinggarmentsuit.
The datahave beengivento thesponsorforanalysis.
DSO 604 - Visual-VestlbularIntegrationas a Functionof Adaptation(0I-3)- The
datawere collectedwithoutincidentfromthreecrewmembersfor thisDSO. This
DSO providesdataon the paradoxicalillusionswhichoccurduringre-adaptation
to gravityby measuringtheaccuracyand strategiesof targetacquisitionduring
normalheadand eyemovementsduringflight. The datahave beengivento the
sponsorforanalysisand reporting.
DSO 624 - CardiovascularResponsesto SubmaximalExercise(Ergometer)- Data
o_. were collectedwithoutincidentfromfourcrewmembersfor thisexerciseDSO.
ThisDSO providesdataon changesin aerobiccapacityby usingsubmaximal
31
exercise testing to correlate preflight and in-flight crew activity with
postflight aerobic performance. The data will assist in the development of ....
optimal exercise prescriptions and countermeasures to prevent decrements in the
nominal cardiorespiratory response and muscle performance. The data have been
given to the sponsor for analysis.
DSO 626 - Cardiovascular Responses to Standing Postflight - Postflight data were
collected without incident from all crewmembers for this DS0. Data for this DS0
characterizes the integrated responses of arterial pressure control systems to
standing before and after space flight. The data have been given to the sponsor
for analysis.
DSO 901 - Documentary Television - Video tapes were made of all documentary
television activities, and all requirements of this DS0 were met. The tapes
have been returned to the sponsor for evaluation.
DSO 902 - Documentary Motion Picture Photography - All planned documentary
motion picture photography objectives were completed. The film has been
processed and given to the sponsor for evalution.
DSO 903 - Documentary Still Photography - All planned documentary still
photography objectives were completed. The film has been processed and given to
the sponsor for evaluation.
PHOTOGRAPHYAND TELEVISION ANALYSES
- ,
LAUNCHPHOTOGRAPHYAND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS
On launch day, 24 videos of the liftoff and ascent operations were revlewed_ and
following launch day, 51 of the 54 expected films were reviewed. Three cameras
did not operate. No potential anomalies were identified from the video and
film review.
ON-ORBIT PHOTOGRAPHYAND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS
No analysis of on-orbit video or film was performed during the mission.
However, all of the still photography taken during the mission is being reviewed
by the sponsor of DSO 903 - Documentary Still Photography.
ENTRY PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS
Fourteen videos of the landing, in addition to the NASA Select video, were
evaluated, and no anomalies were identified.
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f- TABLEI.- STS-61SEOUENCEOF EVENTS
Event Description Actualtime,
G.m.t.
!APUActivation APU-IGG chamberpressure 336:09:22:11.76
APU-2GG chamberpressure 336:09:22:12.97
- APU-3GG chamberpressure 336:09:22:14.13
SRB HPUActivationa LH HPU systemA startcommand 336:09:26:32.103
LH HPU systemB startcommand 336:09:26:32.263
RH HPU systemA startcommand 336:09:26:32.423
RH HPU systemB startcommand 336:09:26:32.543
MainPropulsionSystem Engine3 startcommandaccepted 336:09:26:52.442
Starta Engine2 startcommandaccepted 336:09:26:52.545
Engine1 startcommandaccepted 336:09:26:52.685
SRBIgnitionCommand SRB ignitioncommandto SRB 336:09:26:59.983
(lift-off)
ThrottleUp to Engine2 commandaccepted 336:09:27:04.385
100 PercentThrusta Engine3 commandaccepted 336:09:27:04.402
Engine 1 command accepted 336:09:27:04.405
Throttle Down to Engine 1 command accepted 336:09:27:27.246
73 Percent Thrust a Engine 2 commandaccepted 336:09:27:27.266
Engine 3 commandaccepted 336:09:27:27.282
Throttle Up to Engine 1 command accepted 336:09:27:56.846
104 Percent Thrust a Engine 2 commandaccepted 336:09:27:56.866
Engine 3 commandaccepted 336:09:27:56.883
.... Maximum Dynamic Derived ascent dynamic 336:09:28:07
Pressure (q) pressure
Both SRM's Chamber LHSRMchamber pressure 336:09:29:00.903
Pressureat 50 psia mid-range select
RH SRM chamberpressure 336:09:29:01.263
mid-rangeselect
End SRMActiona LH SRM chamberpressure 336:09:29:03.433
mid-rangeselect
RH SRM chamberpressure 336:09:29:04.133
mid-rangeselect
SRB SeparationCommand SRBseparationcommandflag 336:09:29:07
SRB Physical LH rateAPU A turbinespeedLOS 336:09:29:06.663
Separationa RH rateAPU A turbinespeedLOS 336:09:29:06.663
Throttle Down for Engine 1 command accepted 336:09:34:29.491
3g Acceleratlon a Engine 3 commandaccepted 336:09:34:29.492
Engine 2 commandaccepted 336:09:34:29.513
3g Acceleration Total load factor 336:09:34:29.4
Throttle Downto Engine 1 commandaccepted 336:09:35:25.172
67 Percent Thrust a Engine 3 command accepted 336:09:35:25.173
Engine 2 commandaccepted 336:09:35:25.194
Engine Shutdown a Engine 1 command accept 336:09:35:31.292
Engine 3 commandaccept 336:09:35:31.294
Engine 2 commandaccept 336:09:35:31.314
MECO Commandflag 336:09:35:32
Confirmflag 336:09:35:33
i-_ aMSFC supplied data
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TABLE I.- STS-61 SEQUENCEOF EVENTS (Continued)
Event Description Actual time,
G.m.t.
ET Separation ET separationcommandflag 336:09:35:51
OMS-I Ignition Left engine bi-propvalve Not performed-
position direct insertion
Right engine bi-propvalve trajectoryflown
position
0MS-I Cutoff Left engine bi-propvalve
position
Right engine bi-propvalve
position ]
APU Deactivation APU-2 GG chamberpressure 336:09:43:43.02
APU-I GG chamberpressure 336:09:43:58.87
APU-3 GG chamberpressure 336:09:43:13.08
OMS-2 Ignition Right engine bi-propvalve 336:10:10:30.2
position
Left engine bi-propvalve 336:10:10:30.2
position
OMS-2 Cutoff Right engine bi-propvalve 336:10:13:51.4
position
Left engine bi-propvalve 336:10:13:51.4
position
PayloadBay Doors Open PLBD right open 1 336:10:55:13
PLBD left open 1 336:10:56:33
OMS-3 Ignition Right engine bi-propvalve 336:14:54:28.9
position
Left engine bi-propvalve 336:14:54:28.9
position
0MS-3 Cutoff Right engine bi-propvalve 336:14:55:28.5
position
Left engine bi-propvalve 336:14:55:28.5
position
Cabin Depressurlzation Cabin pressure 337:04:34:05
OMS-4 Ignition Right engine bi-propvalve 337:13:10:59.7
position
Left engine bi-propvalve 337:13:10:59.9
position
0MS-4Cutoff Rightenginebi-propvalve 337:13:11:30.2
position
Leftenginebi-propvalve 337:13:11:30.3
position
0MS-5 Ignition Left engine bi-propvalve 337:13:44:14.3
position
Right engine bi-propvalve Not Applicable
position
OMS-5 Cutof_ Left engine bi-propvalve 337:13:44:31.7
position
Right engine bi-propvalve Not Applicable
position o_-_
aMSFC supplied data
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:_ TABLE I.- STS-61SEOUENCE OF EVENTS (Continued)!
Event Description Actual time,
G.m.t.
OMS-6Ignition Rightenginebi-propvalve 338:03:22:30.1
position
Left engine bi-propvalve Not Applicable
position
OMS-6 Cutoff Right engine bi-prop valve 338:03:22:45.4
position
Left engine bl-prop valve Not Applicable
position
Hubble Space Telescope
Grapple Payloadcaptured 338:08:46:56
Berth Payloadlatch IA latchedind. 338:09:24:30
ExtravehicularActivity
First
EMU on InternalPower EVA LSS batterychargecurrent1 339:03:44:26
Repressurlzation Airlockdifferentialpressure1 339:11:38:24
Second
EMU on InternalPower EVA LSS batterychargecurrent1 340:03:29:02
Repressurization Airlockdifferentialpressure1 340:10:04:32
Third
EMU on InternalPower EVA LSS batterychargecurrent1 341:03:35:44
Repressurization Airlockdifferentialpressure1 341:10:23:05
/- Fourth
EMU on InternalPower EVA LSS batterychargecurrent1 342:03:12:50
Repressurization Airlockdifferentialpressure1 342:10:03:42
Fifth
EMU on InternalPower EVA LSS batterychargecurrent1 343:03:27:33
Repressurization Airlockdifferentialpressure1 343:10:50:33
Hubble Space Telescope
Second Grapple Payload captured 344: 07: 44:14
Unberth Payloadlatch IA releasedind. 344:07:53:11
Release Payloadcaptured 344:I0:26:47
Cabin Repressurization Cabin pressure 345:06:45:45
Flight Control
System Checkout
APU Start APU-1 GG chamberpressure 346:02:28:37.80
APU Stop APU-I GG chamberpressure 346:02:33:16.36
PayloadBayDoorsClose FLBD left close 1 347:01:36:21
PLBD rightclose1 347:01:37:41
APU ActivationFor APU-2 GG chamberpressure 347:04:09:51.76
Entry APU-I GG chamberpressure 347:04:41:50.40
APU-3 GG chamberpressure 347:04:42:00.19
Deorblt Maneuver Right engine bl-propvalve 347:04:14:45.2
Ignltlon posi tlon
Left engine bi-prop valve 347:04:14:45.2
position
Deorbit Maneuver Cutoff Right engine hi-prop valve 347:04:19:40.5
posi tion
Left engine bi-prop valve 347:04:19:41.1
position .
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TABLEI.- STS-61SEQUENCEOF EVENTS(Concluded) -_
Event Description Actual time,
G.m.t.
Entry Interface (400K) Currentorbitalaltitude 347:04:54:41
above referenceellipsoid
BlackoutEnds Data locked at high sample No blackout
rate
TerminalArea Energy Major mode change (305) 347:05:19:13
Management
Main LandingGear LH MLG tire pressure 347:05:25:33
Contact RH MLG tire pressure 347:05:25:33
Main LandingGear LH MLG weight on wheels 347:05:25:37
Weight On Wheels RH MLG weight on wheels 347:05:25:37
Drag Chute Deploy Drag chute deploy 1 CP Volts 347:05:25:41.4
Nose Landing Gear NLG tire pressure 347:05:25:46
Contact
Nose Landing Gear NLG_r on Wheels -1 347:05:25:46
WeiEht On Wheels
Drag Chute Jettison Drag chute jettison1 CP Volts 347:05:26:07.6
Wheels Stop Velocitywith respect to 347:05:26:26
runway
APU Deactivation APU-I GG chamberpressure 347:05:43:57.53
APU-2 GG chamberpressure 347:05:44:02.83
APU-3 GG chamberpressure 347:05:44:08.94
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TABLE II.- STS-61ORBITERPROBLEMTRACKINGLIST
Number Title Reference Counts
STS-61-V-01 APU 3 X-Axis Accelerometer 336:09:45 G.m.t. The APU3 X-axis accelerometsr data was anomalous during ascent. The
Data Clipped IM 61RF05 X-axis acceleration signal output did not represent the true vibration
IPR 59V-0005 Level of the APU. During the last 19 minutes of the 22-minute run, the
PRAPU-0104 signal was primarily zero with intermittent spikes in the 0 to 5 g
peak-to-peak range. The same signature was seen during entry. This
Troubleshooting isolated the problem to a faulty accoleromater.
LEVEL Ill CLOSURE There was no flightimpact.
KSC: The accelerometer will be removed and replaced.
STS-61-V-02 RightOMS HellumTank 336:15:00G.m.t. Duringthe phasingmaneuver(NC)I firing,the rightOMS helium tank
PressureIndication IM61RF04 pressureindication(V43P5122C)failedlow. There is a redundant
(V43P5122C}FailedLow IPR 59V-0002 sensorfor this tank and data from that sensor remainedgood. Just
priorto the NC3 rendezvousmaneuver,the indicationwas restoredwhen
the right OMShelium isolation valves were opened. There was one
firingbetweenthe flrlngwhers the failureoccurredand the firing
LEVELIII CLOSURE where it recovered. The problemdid not recur.
KSC: Pod will be removedand troubleshootingwill be performed.
STS-61-V-03 RCS ThrusterL2U Fall Off 338:02:34G.m.t. RCS thrusterL2U was deselectedby RM at 338:02:34:20G.m.t.when the
IM 61RF03 thrusterwas being used duringthe nominalheightmaneuver. Injector
_o IPR 59V-0003 temperaturesindicatedboth oxidizerand fuel flow occurred,but there
"J was no chamberpressure. L2U is among a group of thrusterswith a
downlist data rate of only 1 sa_le/second in format 179, therefore,
ground data did not capture the actual pressure signature that tripped
RN. The thruster was desolocted and was not used during the remainder
of the mission.
KSC: The pod will be removed and the thruster will be replaced.
STS-61-V-04 Left CMSTotal Fuel 336:10:11 G.m.t. Approximately 10 seconds into the OMS-2maneuver, the left OMStotal
Quantity Incorrect IM 61RF06 quantity indication dropped suddenly to 45 percent and remained there
IPR 59V-0004 throughout the firing. During the NSRmaneuver at 337:12:11 G.m.t.,
the properquantityindicationwas restored. There was one firing
betweenthe firingwhen the failureoccurredand the firingwhere it
recovered. The problem did not recur.
LEVELIII CLOSURE KSC: The pod will be reloved and troubleshooting will be performed.
STS-61-V-05 APU2 Fuel Pu_/GGVN 340:15:10 G.m.t. At approximately 340:15:10 G.m.t., the APU 2 fuel system A heaters did
SystemA HeaterFailure IM61RF07 Not turn on at the expectedcycle-ontemperature. Bypass line -"
IPR 59V-0006 temperaturedroppedfrom 83OF to 66°F over a 6-hourperiod and reached
a steady decay rate of 1.0 degihr. The lower FDAfor this measurement
is 60°F. The crew switched to the B heaters at 341:00:06 G.m.t., and
proper operation was observed. The crew switched back to the A hsater_
later in the mission to aid in troubleshooting and again the heater was
failed. The crew then returned to the B heater.
KSC: Troubleshooting is colplete and the thermostat will be removed
and replaced.
TABLE II.- STS-61ORBITERPROBLEMTRACKINGLIST
Number Title Reference Comments
STS-61-V-06 -Y Star Tracker Not 340:20:11 G.n.t. The -Y star tracker (S/N 2) failed to acquire navigation stars for
Acquiring Stars IM61RFll 5 hours between 340:20 and 341:01 G.m.t. At 341:01:18:10 G.m.t., a
series of three star tracker self-tests failed when the test star was
not acquired. At 341:01:22:56 G.a.t., the star tracker was powered oft
off for 10 seconds. Following the power cycle, the star tracker
successfully passed a self test and functioned nominally for the
remainder of the nttssion. The cause is believed to be a single-event
upset, and no special testing will be performed.
STS-61-V-07 Aft MissionTismr Circuit 339:02:50G.n.t. The crew reportedafterwakingon flightday 3 that the aft mission
Breaker (CBI2)Popped IPR 59V-0007 timerwas blankand CB 12 on panel 015 was popped out. The decision
IM61RF13 was made to leave the circuit breaker open. There was no mission
impact.
KSC: Troubleshooting has failed to repeat the problem or identify
any anomalies.
STS-61-V-08 Ku-Band Range Rate/AzimUth1346:11:30 G.n.t. During Ku-Band antenna stowage prior to entry, the crew reported that
Indicator Units Digit IN 61RF08 the range rate/azimuth digital display had the units digit fail off.
FailedOff IPR 59V-0010 This displayis on panelA2 and is used to displaythe azimuthangleof
t_ PR COMM_077 of the Ku-Bandantennawhen it is deployedand poweredon and can
CO displayrange rateinformationwhen the Ku-Bandantennais operatingin
the rendezvousradarmode. The crew also reportedthat the failure
light associated with the range/elevation and range rate/azimuth
LEVELIII CLO_3RE displays illuminated.
KSC: The digital display unit has been removed and replaced.
The retest is being scheduled.
STS-61-V-09 APU 3 EGT1 (V46T0342A) 347:05:06 G.n.t. Exhaust gas temperature 1 on APU3 (V46T0342A) was erratic during the
Erratic IN 61RF09 entry run of that APU. The temperature indication was erratic for
PR APU-0103 approximately 20 Itinutes of the 1 hour 2 minute run. The data tracked
the _T 2 indication (V46T0340A} during the first and the last
LEVELIII CLOSURE 20 minutesof the run.
KSC: The EGT transducerhas been removedand replaced.
STS-61-V-10 MA_ BITE "FAIL"S/B 345:04:32G.a.t. k_en the NADS recorderwas poweredup for the GPS 171"0,the MADS
"GOOD" IPR 59V-0013 recorderBITE indicationfailedto go from "FAIL"to "GOOD"when the
crew switchedon the recordermasterpower. The BITE indication -
changedto "GOOD"afterthe "WB-ON"and "PC34-ON"comeandswere sent.
LEVELIII CLOSURE Subsequentrecorderoperationswere nominal. Input from the crew at
the crew debriefingindicatesthat the signaturewas due to the onboardl
switchconflguratlon.No specialtastingis planned.
STS-61-V-II Aft StarboardFloodlight 347:01:17G.a.t. The aft starboardpayloadbay floodlightwas confirmedfailedduring
Failed IN 61RFI0 payloadbay door closure. There was no evidenceof the arcing
LEVEL III CLOSURE IPR 59V-0009 signatureseenduringpreviousfloodlightfailures.
KS(:: Troubleshootingwill be perforzmdto isolatethe problemto the
lightor FEA.
/TABLE II.- STS-61ORBITERPROBLEMTRACKINGLIST
Number Title Reference torments
STS-61-V-12smallCabinAirLeakage 345:04:53G.Lt. Duringa conmodecycleat 345:04:53G.m.t.,cabindp/dtmeasured
ThroughWCS -0.040psi/mainfor2.5minutes.Duringa subsequentco_aodecycleat
345:15:34G.m.t.,cabindp/dtmeasured-0.052psi/min.Theevents
were70and 85 secondslongerthannormalWCS/con_noder pressurizations
Inbothcases,theleakagestoppedwhenthecrewproceededthroughthe
nornalWCSuse perthecuecard. Symptonsare consistentwith
repressurizationstartpriorto fullvacuumshutoff causinga larger-
than-normalvolumeof airtoflow. The_S has beenreturnedtoJSC
andcheckedout. No anomalieswerenoted.At theWCS debriefing,the
c_ewreportedthattherewereno improperWCS operations.
STS-61-V-13 High Load on APU 3 During 347:05:44G.n.t. Duringthe postlandingshutdownof the APUs, an unexplainedload
PostlandingShutdown IM61RFI2 increasewas observedon APU 3. APUs I, 2, and 3 were shut down in
that order with approximately5 secondsbetweeneach APU shutdown. The
APU 3 load increase,observedfollowingthe APU 1 shutdown,remained
essentiallyconstantuntil shutdown. An increasein the SSME 3 return
pressurewas also noted duringthe same time period.
KSC: Troubleshootingplanhas been developedand testinghas been
to scheduled.
_O
STS-61-V-14 BrokenDogboneRetaining Postfllght A clip used to retainthe dogbonebetweenport payloadbay door panels
Angle Inspection I and 2 broke away from the graphite/epoxyretainingangle. The
IMKB2912 failure resultedin a 1.25 by 0.5 inchmissingsectionof the angleand
PRSTR-1238 an area of dela_inatlon.The brokensectionis on panel 2 near the
centerline. Rockwell-Tulsa Personnel will repair the retaining angle.
KSC: Inspections of all payload bay door expansion joints and an
evaluation of the joint design are planned.
TABLE IZI.- 5TS-62 GFE PROBLENTRACKING LIST
Number Title Reference Comments
STS-61-F-01 EMU3 Loss of Orbiter 340:03:47 G.n.t. Upon EVA-2 egress, E_ 3 could not receive transmissions from in-cabin
Voice cre_mbers while E_/ 3 was using communications mode A or B. EVA
crewnenbors chose to relay messages between the two czewnenbers rather
than using the backup cozmmnications node. About 3 hours 10 minutes
into the EVA (340:06:45 GJ.t.), EMU3 reception was restored with no
action. Later, E_ 3 reception was lost again. EMU3 was still unabl_
to receive when hooked up hardline in the airlock. Similar problems
were exporienced with EMU3 communications during EVA 4.
STS-61-F-02 Middeck Battery Charger 339:15:24 G.n.t. The crew reported anomalous behavior when using one of the two middeck
(S/N 002) In-_arge battery chargers (S/N 002) following EVA1. With both batteries
Indiction Failure connected and powered up, both green lights came on for approximately
5 seconds (which is nominal). However, after the green lights
extinguished, only one of the two red lights came on. Each of the red
lights indicates that the associated battery is charging. The crew
LEVELIII CLOSURE switched to the S/N 001 middeck battery charger which operated
nominally. The SiN 002 battery charger was stowed.
ISTS-61-F-03In-SuitDrlng Bags Leaklng338:12:24G.a.t. Prior to EVA I afterfillingthe E_J in-suitdrink bag for EMU 2, the
From Fill Port bag began leakingfrom the fill port. After fillingthe other drink
_. bag prior to EVA 3, the secondbag also developeda similarleak. An
O IFNconslsting of insertinga drinkstraw intothe port, bondingthe
straw,and tapingit to the bag was successfullyused for EVAs after
each leakwas discovered. After EVA 4, the crew reportedthat the bags
were no longerleakingand the IFMwes no longernecessary.
STS-61-F-04 EV2 IntermittentLoss of 343:12:36G.n.t. The biomedicalsignalfor EV2 was unavailablefor over 90 percentof
BiomedicalData EVA5. Troubleshootingdone by the crew afterEVA 5 showedno loose
connections.Since the RTDS data were stillavailable(whichincludes
LEVEL IlI CLOSURE oxygenconsumptionand use rate for calculationof metabolic rate),the
decisionswas made to continuethe EVA as planned.
STS-61-F-05 CameraB CableHangup 344:05:30G.n.t. CCTV cameraB tilt motionwas hinderedby the electricalcable routing
on severaloccasions. Panningthe camerasuccessfullyfreed the tilt
motionon each occurrence.
STS-61-F-06 OperationsRecorder2 343:11:29G.e.t. Duringthe OperationsRecorder2 playbackthroughthe FM systemover
RecordSpeed Incorrect the MILA groundsite,the modulationwas unreadableat the site. j
Telemetryand co_and track indicatedthat the data shouldhave been
recordedat 24 Ips (960 kbps playback). Over the next site, DGS, the
ground was configured for 192 kbps playback. The recorder was
LEVELIII CLOSURE comunded to playback at 15 ips. The site was then able to process
data successfully. The record-speed change was seen on track 4 in a
segment recorded at 342:05:11 to 343:05:15 G.m.t.
TABLE III.- STS-61GFE PROBLEMTRACKINGLIST
RUmber Tit le Re fe rence Cowaents
ISTS-61-F-07 HST Power Tool (S/lq 1001) 341:06:28 G.m.t. During the fine guidance sensor bay closure, the HST power tool
Failure abruptly stopped working. Changing the batteries, as well as cycling
LEVEL III CLOSURE switches, failed to resolve the problen.
STS-61-F-08 Two In-Suit DrL_k Bags Not 338:12:15 G.m.t. Two largo in-suit drink bags (IDBs) were not stowed. The EVA crews
Stowed shared the two IDEs that were stowed.
STS-61-F-09 D_J 2 Failed 5-psi Leak 343:05:00 G.n.t. EV2 failed the autonated leak chock performed at 5 psi during airlock
Check Prior to EVA 5 dopressurization prior to EVA 5. EV2 passed subsequent leak checks
prior to continuing the depressurization. Suit performance during
EVA 5 was noninal.
TABLE III.-MSFC ELEMENTSPROBLEMTRACKINGLIST
Problem/Title Element Description Counts/Status
STS-61-B-01 Solid Rocket During refurbishment of The concern associated with the loss of turbine blades is potential
Right SRB _ Booster (USBI) the right SRB APU (rock turbine imbalance and subsequent turbine rupture (identified as a
(Rock Posi- k15802 position, S/N 171) at criticality 1 failure). Hovevar, the aost likely result would be
tion) Turbine Sundstrand, portions of similar to that observed on S/N 171, which supported nominal TVC
Heel Damage 62 of the 123 second- performance on the STS-61 mission.
stage turbine wheel
blades were found A materials analysis detarnLined that the turbine blade damage was
missing, precipitated by a unique machining feature which was present on the
second-stage blades of the turbine wheel. The feature introduced a
stress riser which accelerated growth of the known cracks. The turbine
mapping inspection reports were reviewed for the APUs installed on the
STS-60 mission. These reports verified that no unique manufacturing
defects existed which could precipitate turbine wheel damage.
This IFA was basalined on January 31, 1994, on directive no.SO44898.
The Level II IFA closure is pending an assigned action to define steps
taken during manufacturing/inspections which ensure this problem does
no recur. In addition, the Level III PRAC_ tracking number will be
be added to the Flight Problem Report (FPR).
_- STS-61-I-01 Integration(JSC)Duringpostflight Themissingcork material ._asured 0.5 inch axiallyby 2.0 inch
RightRSRM 360L023B-01 inspectionof the right circu_farentlallyby 0.2 inch radially.Evidence of medium-to-heavy
Forward Center RSRM forward center seg- sootingon the leadingedgeof the cork TPS indicated the material was
SegmentAft lent,missingcork was most likelylostduringascent. The RSRM Projectdetermined the loss
GEI Run observed at the forward of cork material was not due to a material and/or processing failure
Hissing TPS edge of the aft GEXTPS since there was no indication of a cork-to-case failure as experienced
run (station 1099) at on STS-26, further suggesting an ascent debris i_act caused the
220 degrees, damage. The cork failure mode was confirmed to be cohesive, as the
cork-to-case bond (adhesive) passed all pull-strength tests. The
remaining cork conditions and noted sooting indicate that some object
impacted the subject area during ascent.
This problem was presented to the PRCB by the RSRN Project, however,
due to the unknown source of the impacting object and vehicle
implications, the IFA was assigned to the Space Shuttle Engineering
Integration Office at JSC. Appropriate inputs/coordination were made
with the NSFC IL_RNand SRB offices relative to the resolution of the -
anomaly.
No right-hand SRB debris sources were identified forward of the damage
site nor were any unusual debris damage observed on the ORBITER RH
lower surface.
TABLE ZZI.- NSFC ELEMENTSPROBLENTRACKING LIST
Problem/ritle Element Description Counts/Status
STS-61-I-01 The vehicle experienced typical prelaunch ice/debris conditions in the
(Continued) acceptable areas such as the feedline brackets and bellows. Review of
the ET separation photographs are inconclusive to identify any ET TPS
anomelies, since the right upper portion oE the LT is not in the
cmra's field of view. Review of the wind tunnel oil flow data
indicated a potential transport mechanism of ice/debris particles from
the right side of the ET to the right-hand SRB exists. The Orbiter
shock wave causes the flow to be in a downward and outboard direction.
Ice particles fro_ the outboard side of the feediine could be trans-
ported towards the SRB.
It was concludeKf the the most probable cause of the SRB cork damage
resulted from an impact from the random shedding of ice along the right
side of the ET (L02 feedZine). The loss of GEZ cork during ascent due
a debris impact at this location is not considered a debris concern
since an impact with the Orbiter lower surface is not expected, and no
evidence of a void induced vertical upward transport exists.
-_" STS-61-Z-02 Integration(JSC)A postflightHDP loads The reconstructioni dicatedsliploadsintheY andZ directionson
t_ Delta Slip reconstruction revealed posts I and 2. Approximately 30 to 40 KIPS were experienced in the
Loads on Right slip loads in posts 1 and lateral loads near peak SSHE buildup (post 1: Y and Z loads, post 2:
SRB Tension 2, Just prior to SRB Y loads only). There was no slip al_arent in any of the axial loads or
HDPs 1 and 2 iguition, in any compression posts.
Similartensionpostloadshaveoccurredflights(STS-27,STS-33,
'STS-33, and STS-S6); however, no slips have been observed since STS-36.
Several possiblexplanationsarebeingconsidered for this condition:
a. Bushing/bearing rotation;
b. Bushin_Vboaring translation;
c. HDP installation procedure;
d. Noment relief mechanism; and
e. Aft skirt dishing.
Although this in-flight anomaly was initially assigned to KSC, it was
later transferred to the Integration Office at JSC. The SRfl Project-"
and USBI personnel will assist in the investigation to coordinate
inputs (if any).

' DOCUMENT SOURCES
In an attempt to define the official as well as the unofficial sources of data
for this mission report, the following list is provided.
i. Flight Requirements Document
2. Public Affairs Press Kit
3. Customer Support Room Daily Reports
4. MER Daily Reports
5. MER Mission Summary Report
6. MER Quick Look Report
7. MER Problem Tracking List
8. MER Event Times
9. Subsystem Manager Reports/Inputs
I0. MOD Systems Anomaly List
II. MSFC Flash Report
12. MSFC Event Times
13. MSFC Interim Report
14. Crew Debriefing comments
15. ShuttleOperationalDataBook
I----.
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/ ACRONYMSANDABBREVIATIONS
The following is a list of the acronyms and abbreviations and their definitions
as these items are used in this document.
ABE arm-basedelectronics
AMOS Air ForceMaul OpticalSiteAlignmentTest
APU auxiliarypowerunit
ARPCS atmosphericrevitalizationpressurecontrolsystem
AIRS atmosphericrevitalizationsystem
ATCS activethermalcontrolsystem
ATP acceptancetestprocedure
BITE built-in test equipment
CB circuit breaker
CCTV closedcircuittelevision
CCVA chambercoolantvalveactuator
COSTAR CorrectiveOpticsSpaceTelescopeAxialReplacement
DIU datainterfaceunit
DMHS dome-mountedheatshield
DPS dataprocessingsystem
DSO DetailedSupplementaryObjective
DTO DevelopmentTestObjective
AP differentialpressure
AV differentialvelocity
ECLSS EnvironmentalControland LifeSupportSystem
ECU electronicontrolunit
EE end effector
EGT exhaustgas temperature
EMU extravehicularmobilityunit
EPDC electricalpowerdistributionand controlsubsystem
ET ExternalTank
EVA extravehicularactivity
EVI extravehicularcrewmember1 (Hoffman)
EV2 extravehicularcrewmember2 (Musgrave)
EV3 extravehicularcrewmember3 (Thornton)
EV4 extravehicularcrewmember4 (Akers)
FCS flightcontrolsystem
FCV flowcontrolvalve
FDA faultdetectionannunciation
FES flashevaporatorsystem
FM frequencymodulation
FSS FlightSupportSystem
ft/sec feetper second
g gravity
GEl ground environment instrumentation
GFE Government furnished equipment
GGVM gas generatorvalvemodule
gaseoushydrogen
G_S GoddardHigh ResolutionSpectrometer
G.m.t. Greenwichmean time
-I- GPC generalpurposecomputer
GPS GlobalPositioningSystem
GSE groundsupportequipment
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HAINS High Accuracy Inertial Navigation System
HPFTP high pressure fuel turbopump
HPOTP high pressure oxidizer turbopump
HSP High Speed Photometer
HST Hubble Space Telescope
ICBC IMAX Cargo Bay Camera
ICD Interface Control Document
IDT image dissector tube
IFM in-flight maintenance
IGNC Integrated Guidance, Navigation and Control
IMAX CanadianCameraSystem
IMU inertialmeasurementunit
ips inches per second
IRD integrated receiver decoder
Isp specific impulse
ITEPC Inter Mars Tissue Equivalent Proportional Counter
JSC Johnson Space Center
keas knots equivalent air speed
KSC Kennedy Space Center
kwh kilowatt hours
LCC Launch Commit Criteria
LESC Lockheed Engineering and Sciences Company
liquid hydrogen
i!_e lubrication
liquid oxygen
MADS modular auxiliary data system .----,
MC mldcourse correction maneuver
MClU manipulatorcontrollerinterfaceunit
MECO main enginecutoff
MET missionelapsedtime
MFR manipulatorfootrestraint
MHz MegaHertz
MLGD main landinggeardoor
MLP MobileLaunchPlatform
MPM manipulatorpositioningmechanism
MPS main propulsion system
MSFC GeorgeC. MarshallSpaceFlightCenter
MSS MagneticSensingSystem
MTU mastertimingunit
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NCC corrective combination maneuver
NC phase adjust maneuver
NH height adjust maneuver
NLGD nose landing gear door
nmi. nautical mile
NPSP net positive suction pressure
NSR Coelliptic rendezvous maneuver
NSTS National Space Transportation System
OML outer moldline
OMRSD Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document
OMS orbital maneuvering subsystem
PDM primary deployment mechanism _-'-
PDU power drive unit
PFR portable foot restraint
B-2
! PGSC PayloadGeneral SupportComputer
PILOT PortableIn-FlightLandingOperationsTrainer
PMBT propellantmean bulk temperature
ppm parts per million
PRSD power reactantstorageand distribution
RCC reusablecarbon carbon
RCS reactioncontrolsubsystem
RM redundancymanagement
RMS remote manipulatorsystem
RSRM RedesignedSolid Rocket Motor
RSU Rate SensingUnit
RTDS real-timedata system
RTL ready-to-latch
S&A safe and arm
SADE Solar Array Drive Electronics
SDM secondarydrive mechanism
SEU single event upset
SLF ShuttleLandingFacility
S/N serial number
SODB ShuttleOperationalData Book
SRB Solid Rocket Booster
SRSS ShuttleRange Safety System
SSME Space Shuttlemain engine
SSST solid-statestar tracker
STS Space TransportationSystem
TPL telemetryformat load
TI terminalinitiation
TIG time of ignition
TPS thermalprotectionsubsystem
VBAR positionon velocityvectorwith relativerates nulled
WCS Waste CollectionSystem
WF/PC Wide Field/PlanetaryCamera
WSB water spray boiler
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Appendix C
I IMAX POST LAUNCH MISSIONOPERATION
TITLE: Imax CABIN CAMERA& Imax CARGO BAYCAMERA (ICBC)
ACTUALlAUNCHDATEANDTIME: The Imax Cameras were flown on
the Orbiter, Endeavor (OV-105), on the STS 61 mission. The flight
lifted off from KSCat 4:27 a.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST) on
December 2, 1994, and landed at KSCat 00:26 a.m. EST on December
13, 1994, after a mission duration of 10 days, 19 hours and 59
minutes.
OBJECTIVE: The objective of the Imax camera system was to film the
Hubble Space Telescope (HST) servicing operations. To capture the
repair activity from the vantage point of the cabin, seven rolls of
film, five exterior and two interior, were used to film scenes of repair
and crew activities, as well as some earth scenes. The ICBCwas
mounted in the aft port corner of the payload bay (bay 13). The
optical axis of the ICBCwas in a fixed position designed provide the
optimum viewing angle to capture the most significant activities of
the retrieval and re-deploy of the HST. Footage also was taken of the
re-boost of the HST to a higher altitude to increase its orbital
longevity.
INITIAL RESULTS: The Cabin film was removed from the Orbiter and
rushed to a California laboratory for processing and review. The
laboratorypersonnel commented that the film from this mission was
the cleanest of all Imax shuttle missions. The Imax film producer,
Graeme Ferguson, reviewed the film and reported it to be
sensational. He also corn°n-reed that using "slower _ interior film and
extla photofloods on this mission greatly reduced the destructive
effects of radiation (fogging of film) on the image quality. Overall,
response from the crew was that all Imax equipment worked
extremely well and problems were non-existent.
NON-PlANNED EVENTS: Operations were nominal.
CURRENT STATUS: At the present time, no further IMAXactivity has
been planned, STS-61 was the last mission on which the Imax
equipment will be used in space.
¢-1
SIGNIFICANT DATA: r-_
o Using "slower" interior film and extra photofloods on this
mission greatly reduced the destructive effects of radiation on
the image quality.
o The crew wished for an alternative to the GAPCto control ICBC
and suggested replacing the existing 60-minute audio tapes
(provided by Imax to create an audio record) with longer tapes.
o The crew stated that many more exceptional shots could have
been made ff there had been a second ICBCmounted in the
forward part of the payload bay.
SUMMARY:The Imax ICBCcamera system provided a spectacular
view of the retrieval, re-deploy, and finally the re-boost of the HST
into a higher orbit. The final ICBCshot captured the closing of the
payload bays doors, and the close-out of Imax in space. The Imax
In-cabin camera provided sensational footage to record HST repairs,
crew activity and earth scenes. All Imax equipment worked well
and no problems were encountered, during the STS-61 mission, with
all objectives achieved. ---,
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